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Abstract 
 
The following thesis deals with the representation of themes of assisted dying in 
Max Frisch’s 1933/34 novel Jürg Reinhart and Lukas Bärfuss’ 2005 play Alices Reise in 
die Schweiz (Alice’s Trip to Switzerland), and discusses these representations in the 
context of institutional power and personal agency. I argue that the prewar representation 
of assisted dying has changed significantly this period, in that the institutional powers at 
work have shifted and that portrayals of characters’ agencies have become more 
compelling, seeing an overall increase in narrative importance. 
Utilizing a post-structural theoretical framework, based primarily on work by 
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, I examine the texts in terms of their presentations of 
assisted dying by considering the discursive frameworks within which those 
representations find themselves. I do this by first examining the different institutional 
influences at work in the texts, such as the juridical and the medical, in order to determine 
the extent and nature of this influence, as it pertains to questions of assisted dying. Then, 
owing to the importance of humanist discourses of self-determination to the assisted 
dying debate, I examine the role and extent of agency as portrayed in the texts, within the 
context of the aforementioned discursive influences. Through this analysis, this thesis 
seeks to address the role of literature in the assisted dying debate by examining the 
various representations of discursive influence, and resistance against it, within the texts, 
in a bid to reach further understandings of how these institutions, such as the medical 
institution, work in reference to assisted dying. 
In chapter two, I provide an introduction to the research context within which 
these texts exist, examining secondary scholarship on the works and addressing the social 
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context that grounds discussions of assisted dying. In the next chapter, I place this thesis 
in its theoretical context, establishing a methodological approach for the examination of 
power and agency in the texts. Then, in the two chapters that form the bulk of my 
analysis, I approach the works in turn, each time considering the institutional powers at 
work in the text, before moving to an examination of the portrayals of agency. 
I conclude that my chosen texts suggest that the discourses around assisted dying 
have changed, with the influence of religious discourse giving way, at least partially, to a 
more general public discourse, while the regulating effects of the juridical and medical 
spheres remain constant. Additionally, the role of agency in conversations around 
assisted dying, as reflected in the texts, seems to have become more important, as 
evidenced by the differences in representation between the works. These findings show 
that, owing to the discursive relationship between literature and public discourse, similar 
developments have occurred outside of the literary sphere.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 As a topic of historical and contemporary discussion, assisted dying is a sensitive 
topic; given existing connotations of eugenics and associations with the euthanasia 
program of the Third Reich, as well as persistent questions of agency and self-
determination, this is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, in recent years, this potentially 
volatile, and undoubtedly polarizing, topic is again a subject of discussion, as a host of 
persistent questions, ethical and otherwise, have come up again in the public discourse. 
Accordingly, governments increasingly find themselves confronted with difficult 
decisions to make on behalf of their citizens; for example, in February 2015, the 
Canadian Supreme Court struck down the ban on assisted suicide (McLeod), and in 2011 
Swiss citizens voted against restricting assisted suicide services to Swiss patients, leaving 
the services legal for use by foreign nationals (The Telegraph). This progression is 
reflected in the themes handled by German-language literature over the last century, with 
an increasing number of authors, such as Daniel Kehlmann and Wolfgang Prosinger, 
becoming willing to engage with this topic in their work in recent years. The inspiration 
for this thesis grew out of a personal interest in bioethics, the value and importance of 
subjective experience to contemporary ethical debates, and the role of narratives in the 
discussion of these questions. I believe it is becoming increasingly important to discuss 
topics around death, such as assisted suicide, and that, owing to the uniquely personal 
nature of dying, one ought to do so in a manner sensitive to the experiences of the dying 
individual and those around them.  
Through this thesis project, I investigate how the topic of assisted dying is 
represented in Max Frisch’s Jürg Reinhart (1933/34) and Lukas Bärfuss’ Alices Reise in 
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die Schweiz (2007), with the aim of determining how the works frame the discourse about 
assisted dying. I focus this examination on two aspects of the works, the portrayals of 
institutional power and personal agency, with the aim of exploring the power relations 
present in the works. Additionally, I examine how the representations of institutional 
power and personal agency differ between the works, in order to locate commonalities in 
the works’ framing of the discourses surrounding assisted dying. 
Accordingly, the research questions I consider focus on the changes undergone in 
Swiss literature that handles the theme of assisted dying between the prewar and 
contemporary time periods. I aim to answer two main questions: firstly, how has, in light 
of the historical taboo surrounding assisted dying, the contemporary discourse about 
assisted dying changed since prior to the Second World War? And secondly, although 
there may or may not have been significant changes to the discourse about assisted dying, 
has there been a shift in the representation of personal agency and the role of institutional 
power? 
 Before I continue, I would first like to provide a brief explanation of terms 
relevant to this thesis project and the broader assisted dying debate. Beginning with the 
older, oft-maligned, term “euthanasia,” euthanasia, in contemporary usage, refers to “the 
action of directly causing the quick and painless death of a person, or omitting to prevent 
it when intervention was within the agent's powers” (Blackburn). Accordingly, 
euthanasia is a blanket term, encompassing “active” and “passive” varieties; active 
euthanasia is “acting to bring death about,” for example, administering a lethal injection, 
while passive euthanasia means “not preventing [death],” by, for example, withholding 
medical treatment (Blackburn).  
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Following these categorizations, the terms “assisted dying” and “assisted suicide,” 
then, refer specifically to a form of active euthanasia in which a person is helped to die by 
their own request (Humphrey 2006). Even more specifically, “physician-assisted suicide,” 
or “PAS,” refers to this process as performed by a physician, where the physician helps a 
patient to die by prescribing a lethal overdose, which the patient then chooses to drink 
(Humphrey 2006). With these definitions in mind, I favour the use of the terms “assisted 
dying” and “assisted suicide” over euthanasia throughout this thesis for reasons of clarity; 
this being said, I use the term “euthanasia” a number of times in reference to texts that 
utilize the term themselves. 
Despite the fact that texts handling themes of assisted dying are relatively rare, as 
opposed to broader themes of suicide or illness, since the turn of the twenty-first century 
an increasing number of authors have turned their attention to this issue; fewer in number 
still are pre-World War Two texts that approach assisted dying in a way distinct from 
discussions of suicide. As contemporary and prewar examples of the literary treatment of 
the theme of assisted dying, respectively, Alices Reise in die Schweiz and Jürg Reinhart 
are particularly well-suited to my purposes primarily because these texts not only engage 
with the topic, but they do so by foregrounding the experiences and actions of individuals 
within the systems of institutional power that frame the assisted dying debate. In doing so, 
the texts not only provide a fictional representation of the dominant social and cultural 
discourses about assisted dying and free choice, but they also allow for an analysis of the 
problematic concept of agency within institutional power structures. In choosing these 
texts, I am able to conduct an analysis focused on issues of power and agency that 
permits deeper insights on the characters, their actions, and experiences within the power 
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structures that are prescribed by social, cultural and medical discourses, while being 
rooted in the discourse about assisted dying.   
Although the selection of German-language fictional texts in this area is relatively 
limited, the aforementioned texts are by no means the only options for study; alternatives 
could include Tanner geht by Wolfgang Prosinger (2008) or Heute sterben immer nur die 
andern by Charlotte Worgitzky (1986). However, what sets Alices Reise in die Schweiz 
and Jürg Reinhart apart is their origin: these texts were written by Swiss authors. The 
question then becomes, why select Swiss texts over works of German or Austrian origin 
when focusing on German-language literature? As Switzerland remains the only country 
in the world to extend the ability to be assisted in suicide to non-citizens, a “one-way trip 
to Switzerland” remains the only viable option for many who wish to end their lives 
legally and with dignity; thus, Swiss discourses on assisted dying are relevant for 
discussions in other countries as well. By focusing my analysis on texts that form a part 
of the Swiss literary discourse, and as such engage with Swiss public discourse, I broaden 
the possible applications of my analysis beyond the realm of Swiss literature. As Swiss 
clinics are, for many people, the only means of accessing legal assisted suicide services, 
foreign clients and their families are subject to the uniquely Swiss discourses which 
frame the service, despite not being Swiss themselves. Additionally, as Switzerland is 
one of only three nations that have legalized assisted suicide, next to Belgium and the 
Netherlands, these discourses also affect those who would use the Swiss model as 
guidance for developing a similar model in their home countries, such as Canada in light 
of the recent decriminalization of assisted suicide (McLeod). Thus, by choosing Swiss 
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texts and engaging with Swiss discourses about assisted dying, my analysis can produce 
insights applicable to a broader spectrum of discussions on assisted dying than otherwise. 
In order to answer the above-described research questions, I conduct an analysis 
of how institutional power and agency are depicted and how they are shown as being 
constitutive of subjecthood, what limits are placed on agency, and what areas of 
resistance are shown in Alices Reise in die Schweiz and Jürg Reinhart. Through this 
comparative analysis, I aim to contribute to a greater understanding of the public 
discourse surrounding the topic of assisted dying, produced in part as it is by literary 
representations. Ultimately, I argue that the prewar representation of assisted dying has 
changed considerably, in that the institutional powers at work have shifted and that 
portrayals of characters’ agencies have become more significant, seeing an overall 
increase in narrative importance. 
Before moving on to this analysis, I will first present an overview of the research 
context within which this thesis is situated, as well as an explanation of the theoretical 
approach I use for my analysis. Following this, I will consider the representations of 
institutional power and agency in the context of assisted dying in my chosen texts, 
beginning with Jürg Reinhart before moving on to Alices Reise in die Schweiz. Then, to 
conclude my thesis, I will distill and present my findings, synthesizing what I have 
uncovered from the two texts in order to provide answers to my research questions. 
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Chapter 2: Research Context 
 
In order to situate this thesis project, the following chapter will present an 
overview of the relevant historical, social, political, and literary contexts surrounding the 
theme of assisted suicide. Beginning by outlining the legal state of assisted suicide in 
Switzerland and Canada, the chapter will then conduct an examination of current 
scholarly approaches to the issue of assisted dying, followed by a presentation of the 
available literary scholarship on assisted dying in German-language literature. Lastly, the 
chapter will consider the available literature on Max Frisch’s Jürg Reinhart and Lukas 
Bärfuss’ Alices Reise in die Schweiz and the intended direction of the project, given its 
research context. 
The subject of assisted dying has historically been a sensitive topic; given the 
connotations of eugenics and associations with the euthanasia program of the Third 
Reich, alongside the difficult questions that accompany the process of a loved one dying, 
this comes as no surprise. However, in recent years this subject has again been thrust into 
the spotlight as individuals and organizations appeal for, or reaffirm their commitments 
to, the right to die with dignity.  
Recent developments in the debate surrounding assisted dying include a decision 
by the Canadian Supreme Court, as the long-standing ban on assisted suicide was struck 
down (McLeod 2015, Fine 2015), and the 2011 referendum in Switzerland, where Swiss 
citizens voted against restricting assisted suicide services to Swiss patients, leaving the 
services legal for use by foreign nationals (The Telegraph). Despite these developments 
and the generally favourable attitude towards legal assisted suicide in both Canada and 
Switzerland, the topic remains a subject of much debate; for example, in light of the 
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recent legalization of physician-assisted suicide in Canada, issues of elder abuse and 
concern for the increasingly complex situation faced by the families of ill persons were 
recently addressed in an article in the Montreal Gazette (Miedema 2015).  
Just as the decriminalization of assisted suicide in Belgium (Lewy 69), the 
Netherlands in 2002 (18), and in the American state of Oregon in 1997 (126), with 
Washington, Vermont, Montana, and New Mexico following suit over the years (Cessou 
et. al.), the recent legal developments in Canada are indicative of this gradual shift 
towards the broader legalization of assisted suicide. With the exception of Switzerland, 
which I will discuss below, and Canada, where the decision to lift the ban on assisted 
suicide is set to come into effect in February 2016 (Fine), the above jurisdictions have a 
number of commonalities between them. In each of these states, only a physician may 
assist in a person’s suicide, although without personally administering the lethal dose of 
medication required, and none of them legally allow for foreign nationals to access these 
services (Humphrey 2010).  
In Switzerland, the process has been legal since 1918 (Appel 21), pursuant to 
articles 114 and 115 of the Swiss Criminal Code (Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 52). 
Owing at least in part to its much earlier legalization, the Swiss approach to assisted 
suicide can be said to have served as a model for other nations; however, the Swiss 
approach is distinct in a number of ways. One of these differences is that the actual 
assistance in ending one’s life can be, and often is, provided by non-physicians (Lewy 
88); since 1982, this has been done primarily by the advocacy organizations Exit – 
German Switzerland (89), Exit – ADMD (102) and Dignitas (105). This is not to say that 
instances of physician-assisted suicide do not occur; although the Swiss Academy of 
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Medical Sciences regards assisted suicide as not being part of a physician’s mandate, 
physicians are legally left with the same discretion as any citizen as to whether or not 
they wish to aid in a patient’s suicide (Hurst and Mauron 271). 
Additionally, Switzerland remains to this day the only jurisdiction that legally 
allows non-residents to access assisted suicide services (Appel 21), resulting in the 
phenomenon of “suicide tourism,” when foreign nationals travel to Switzerland for the 
express purpose of ending their lives legally. The public opinion on the openness of these 
services is quite positive, so much that multiple referenda, resulting from challenges to 
“suicide tourism” in the courts beginning in 2008 and 2009 (Lewy 124), have been 
roundly rejected by Swiss voters (The Telegraph). Lastly, not only are Swiss assisted 
dying services open for use by foreigners, they are further distinguished by their 
availability to persons suffering from mental illnesses (Appel 21). Taken together, the 
unique characteristics of the Swiss approach to assisted dying, particularly its availability 
to foreigners, ensure that Swiss discourses around assisted dying are relevant for and 
affect discussions in other countries. Thus, by focusing on Swiss representations of 
assisted dying, this project engages with assisted dying discourses in a broader, 
transnational sense. 
The recent progression towards a broader legalization of assisted suicide in the 
western world, as discussed above, is reflected in the themes that German-language 
literature has engaged with over the last century, with an increasing number of authors 
becoming willing to engage with this topic in their work. Since the turn of the twenty-
first century, approximately thirty relevant works have been published in German, 
French, and English (Keller). Despite this renewed interest in the subject of assisted 
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dying, there is a rather noticeable dearth of scholarship addressing my chosen texts in this 
context. Interestingly, both texts under consideration here appear to be, not only in the 
context of scholarship concerned with assisted dying, but generally, rather under-
researched. This could be because of the former’s status as a stage play and the latter’s 
virtual lack of reprintings, perhaps due to the author’s discontent with the novel, referring 
to his debut as he did “als einen ‘sehr jugendlichen Roman’” (Kilcher 85).  
That Frisch was displeased with this novel is clearly shown in his (ultimately 
temporary) choice to leave the writer’s profession shortly after its release and in his 
active attempts to shape the public criticism of his work (Unser 97), including his 
intention to prevent its reprinting in the Gesammelte Werke (1976) (Kilchner 86). 
Additionally, despite the fact that literary works featuring assisted suicide in the 20th 
century were relatively common (Engelhart 14), there is a curious lack of scholarly 
literature engaging with texts addressing the topic of assisted suicide; this seems to point 
at a significant gap in the literature as far as my chosen texts are concerned. 
However, this is not to say that there is a complete lack of literature within which 
to situate my own research; while there is little secondary literature concerning assisted 
dying in my chosen texts, there has been some interest in the social sciences in applying 
post-structuralist frameworks, based largely on Foucauldian notions, to the broader 
question of assisted dying, providing a conceptual framework of much interest for this 
project. This is likely in light of the post-structuralist approach’s view of the individual as 
existing within a system, which provides a unique method for approaching personal 
questions, such of those around dying, in a manner attentive to discursive influence. 
Specifically, some recent articles have theorized assisted dying within the context of 
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Foucault’s concept of biopower, which also forms a large part of the theoretical basis for 
this thesis project. Two articles and a conference paper, which I consider below, focus on 
the application of Foucauldian genealogical analysis and the concept of biopower to 
address different facets of assisted dying: “Exploring Death and Dying through 
Discourse” (2010) by Al Whitney and André Smith; “The Problem with Death: Towards 
a Genealogy of Euthanasia” (2011) by Anne Ryan, Mandy Morgan and Antonia Lyons; 
and “Assisted Dying in the Context of Biopower” (2013) by Anna Kubiak. 
However, before discussing the aforementioned texts, I would like to provide a 
short explanation of a pair of Foucauldian concepts of special importance to all three 
articles: biopower and genealogical inquiry. I will discuss these concepts further in the 
following chapter, as they are of particular use for this thesis project, underpinning the 
theoretical framework of my analysis as they do. Beginning with the former, biopower is 
“the set of mechanisms through which the basic features of the human species [are] the 
object of […] a general strategy of power” (Foucault, Security 16). Biopower refers then 
to all the technologies, discourses, and other mechanisms that regulate the human body in 
society, including setting acceptable codes of behaviour for that body, up to and 
including determining the “correct” modes and methods of dying. Accordingly, the 
concept of biopower carries much theoretical importance for scholarly work around 
assisted dying, concerned as it is with alternative modes of dying. 
Moving on, genealogical inquiry, or simply genealogy, is Foucault’s term for his 
“process of analysing and uncovering the historical relationship between knowledge and 
power” (Danaher xi). As stated by Foucault, the purpose of genealogical inquiry “as an 
analysis […] situated at the point of articulation of the body and history […] is to show a 
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body totally imprinted with history, and history destroying the body” (Nietzsche 83). 
Simply, the goal of genealogical analysis is to approach the body as a locus for 
discourses, i.e. power relations, in order to consider the historical development of those 
relations independently of the body. The following articles take similar approaches to 
their analyses within the context of biopower and assisted suicide. 
The relationship between assisted dying and biopower has also been discussed 
recently by Whitney and Smith in their 2010 paper. In their article, the authors investigate 
contemporary practices of death and dying through an analysis of the discourses which 
structure them, focusing primarily on the practice of palliative or hospice care. The 
authors reach several conclusions, most significantly that the institutional circumstances 
of death and dying are regulated by discourses that act on those who are themselves 
dying. Thus, although dying is a personal experience, it is heavily regulated by the 
institutions of law, medicine, and the discursive practices that structure institutional 
spaces, such as hospitals (76-77). 
Continuing with Ryan, Morgan, and Lyons’ 2011 article, the authors attempt to 
address how euthanasia emerged as a possible solution to terminal illness. In presenting 
their genealogy of assisted dying, that is their historical consideration of the discursive 
power relations acting on the body in the context of assisted dying, the authors reach an 
interesting, perhaps counter-intuitive, conclusion. Although assisted dying can be 
conceived of as providing choice and independence to the terminally ill, the actual 
legalization or implementation of assisted dying services could in fact result in a 
strengthening of governmental power. This is owing to discourses of medicalization and 
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personal autonomy, which endorse the practice of assisted suicide while simultaneously 
allowing for the exercising of power over all people through the medical institution (47).  
The third paper in this vein is Kubiak’s 2013 conference paper focusing on the 
establishment of the assisted dying debate in the context of biopower. Although the 
debate is undoubtedly part of the biopower structure, Kubiak protests against the “loss” 
of the subject to the system; as advocates of assisted dying utilize personal narratives and 
a “rhetoric of choice,” they “speak from the subject point of view” (13-14). In doing so, 
Kubiak points out, despite the undeniable normalizing influence of the various regulating 
discourses of the biopower system on death and dying, the focus of the debate itself on 
the quality of life and dignity of the individual ensures a degree of preserved subjecthood 
that, going forward, is important to observe. 
While each paper utilizes a Foucauldian approach, their goals differ somewhat, 
with one addressing the contemporary practices of death and dying in palliative medicine 
(Whitney and Smith 2010); another the emergence of euthanasia as a possible solution to 
terminal illness (Ryan, Morgan, and Lyons 2011); and the third seeking to frame the 
assisted dying debate (Kubiak 2013). Despite the differences in specific topic, these 
authors each focus their investigations on the relationship between the personal 
experience of death in reference to assisted dying and the regulatory powers that 
influence the process of death. In this project, I take a very similar view, in that I 
approach assisted dying from a perspective that seeks to explore the regulatory powers 
and discourses surrounding it, focusing on manifestations of agency and institutional 
power in literary works about assisted suicide.  
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Likely due in part to the relative lack of secondary work approaching the topic of 
assisted dying in literature, the above-described school of thought appears to be the 
dominant theoretical framework for contemporary theoretical discussions of assisted 
dying. Despite the authors’ academic origins lying in the social sciences, these 
discussions of assisted dying within a Foucauldian perspective are particularly useful for 
my project in that they approach the same subject from a theoretical perspective 
congruent with my own; I will utilize ideas from these social science perspectives on 
assisted dying for the purpose of literary analysis. This approach considers assisted dying 
from a framework that takes into account the discourses involved in framing it, such as 
those of agency and institutional power.  
Just as a post-structuralist approach helps to reveal the influence of discourse on 
and connection to the individual’s experience of death, in this case in matters of assisted 
dying, in sociological or psychological contexts, I believe it can highlight those 
influences in literary representations of assisted dying. Additionally, narratives, non-
fiction pieces and literary works alike, approaching assisted dying can provide insight on 
areas unreachable through analyses in the social sciences. For example, non-fictional 
personal narratives can allow a reader to immerse themselves in the lived experiences of 
another, affording them insights on a topic they could not otherwise attain. Just as non-
fiction narratives, literary works can also give voice to individual experience; however, 
these experiences need not be “actual” experiences – they can be fictional. By presenting 
the experiences of fictional characters with difficult topics, such as assisted dying, 
literature can present perspectives that can be easier to engage with than “real” personal 
narratives by virtue of their “distance” from reality. In providing these kinds of access to 
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experience, narratives can both highlight personal experience, and facilitate conversation 
about difficult experiences and topics; herein lies the advantage to working with narrative 
works when considering assisted dying. Accordingly, I will return to this point in the 
following chapter in the course of developing my methodological approach. 
Moving from the theoretical context, I turn now to an examination of secondary 
work on representations of assisted dying in German-language literature. Gerd Grübler, 
in his 2011 work Euthanasie und Krankenmord in der deutschen Literatur 1885-1936, 
investigates how the themes of euthanasia and the killing of the sick were approached in 
German literature of that time period. Grübler does this by considering a broad spectrum 
of texts from an inter-discursive theoretical perspective (196), with the aim of addressing 
the role of these themes in the texts. Additionally, the text assesses the potential for 
literature to join in on the contemporary discussion of assisted dying (9).  
Through this investigation, Grübler finds that the representations of euthanasia 
within his selected texts vary widely in terms of the manner of presentation and nature of 
the act, with some texts presenting cases of active euthanasia, while others lean more 
towards a characterization of killing by request, killing of the sick, or assisted suicides 
(193). These representations vary just as widely in terms of their associated questions or 
themes, such as ideas of utilitarianism and social Darwinism (192). Interestingly, in 
nineteen of the twenty-nine examined texts, “ist derjenige, der […] Euthanasie leistet […] 
ein Arzt” (194); this underscores the importance of questions of the role of the medical 
profession in modern discussions around assisted suicide, as in every jurisdiction where 
the practice is legal, apart from Switzerland, a doctor must be the one who either 
prescribes or administers the required lethal medication (cf. Cessou et al). 
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Although, as evidenced above, these themes have been examined before in the 
literary discourse, the social taboo surrounding assisted suicide, due in part to 
associations with eugenics and the euthanasia program of the Third Reich, is important to 
be aware of if one wishes to examine assisted dying in more contemporary literary works 
– particularly those works written in German. In a bid to further understand this taboo, 
Dietrich Engelhardt sought to explore the processes of taboo-making and –breaking in his 
1964 paper “Euthanasie zwischen Lebensverkürzung und Sterbebeistand als Tabu in der 
Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts.” Through a consideration of a range of texts from a 
variety of European literary traditions, incorporating a wide variety of representations of 
euthanasia, both active and passive, Engelhardt concludes that these representations can 
be understood not only as breaking the taboo around assisted dying, but also as 
legitimizations thereof (14). Additionally, Engelhardt finds that, in these works, assisted 
suicide “wird meist durch Ärzte […] aber auch durch Pflegepersonen, Angehörige und 
Freunde durchgeführt” (14), and that it is frequently described as a “Begleitung des 
Sterbenden in der Perspektive eines ‘schönen und guten Sterbens’,” (16) and a 
“Zustimmung zur eigenen Endlichkeit” (17). Interestingly, these designations appear to 
be very much in line with the modern Swiss legal perspective on assisted dying. 
A more contemporary perspective on the role of assisted dying in literature comes 
in the form of the most recently published volume of the Zeitschrift für Germanistik, in 
which the themes of death and assisted dying in German-language literature are 
considered from a multitude of perspectives. The collection is prefaced by an 
introduction from Anna Neufeld and Ulrike Vedder, who provide context on the issue 
from the German perspective, referencing two issues of rising importance that are due to 
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come before the Bundestag for discussion in November 2015; firstly, the implementation 
of improved regulations around palliative care, and secondly, the legitimacy of the 
designation of organized assisted dying services, as well as doctor-assisted suicide, as 
punishable offences (Neufeld and Vedder 495). The authors then move to discuss the 
broader role of literature in the discussions around death and assisted dying by first 
giving an overview of the subjects to be considered in the volume, proclaiming, “die 
Fähigkeit der Literatur besteht ja nicht zuletzt darin, dasjenige Darstellung zu bringen, 
was in den großen Sterbenarrativen […] unsichtbar gemacht wird: Ängste, 
Imaginationen, Nachwissen, Unabgegoltenes” (497). In closing, the authors further 
define their thoughts on the role of literature, stating that it is not literature’s place to 
provide programmatic answers to the questions plaguing the issue of assisted suicide; 
rather, literature aims to be “eine Intervention in virulente Debatten um Sterben und Tod: 
mit dem Durchspielen alternativer Entwürfe und offensive imaginärer Möglichkeiten, mit 
historischem Errinerungsvermögen und scharfen Einsichten in alte Bilder und neue 
Normen” (497). 
 This defining of the broader role of literature in discussions of death and dying, 
assisted or otherwise, segues into a discussion of assisted dying in contemporary 
literature in the 2015 article “Sterbehilfe und Sterbebegleitung in gegenwärtiger Literatur 
und Medizin” by Caroline Welsh. Welsh addresses the specific representations of assisted 
dying and palliative or end of life care by examining in turn the specific aestheticizations 
of dying in “Sterbenarrativen,” then considers existing connections between selected 
contemporary works, and the question of suicide tourism, in the context of human rights 
abuses during end of life care (501). Welsh focuses much of her inquiry on Bärfuss’ 
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Alices Reise in die Schweiz and Daniel Kehlmann’s story “Rosalie geht Sterben,” from 
his episodic novel Ruhm (2009), using the pieces as representative of contemporary 
literature around the subject of assisted dying. After considering these works in context, 
the author reaches the conclusion that the texts, despite their many differences, are bound 
up in contemporary cultural and medical practices and discourses around death. 
Accordingly, states Welsh,  
 Sowohl Bärfuss als auch Kehlmann decken in ihren Texten die Ängste und  
 Verdrängungen auf, die dem Wunsch nach Kontrolle und Verkürzung des  
 Sterbeprozesses zugrunde liegen. Ihre Texte hinterfragen das Narrativ vom  
 assistierten Suizid als selbstbestimmtes, würdevolles Sterben und zeigen,  
 dass seine Attraktivität darin besteht, den kulturellen Verdrängungen und  
 Verleugnungen der eigenen Sterblichkeit entgegenzukommen. (510) 
Having utilized Bärfuss’ and Kehlmann’s texts as examples of a broader movement 
within contemporary narratives on the subject of death and dying, as well as Björn Kern’s 
novel Die Erlöser AG (2007), Welsh reaches a final conclusion about the nature of 
literature’s role in the discussion. She concludes that, in response to the cultures and 
discourses surrounding death and illness, in this situation it is the role of literature to 
expand and explain the relationships between them; as stated at the end of the article, “die 
vorgestellten literarischen Texten erkunden die Zusammenhänge zwischen medizinischen 
Versprechen, kulturellen Verdrängungen und gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen” (511). 
Having introduced the above works on assisted dying’s role in literature, I turn 
now to the authors of the texts with which this thesis concerns itself; as previously stated, 
this project focuses on the portrayals of agency and institutional power in reference to 
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assisted dying in Alices Reise in die Schweiz from Lukas Bärfuss and Jürg Reinhart by 
Max Frisch. Beginning with the chronologically earlier and decidedly more canonical of 
the two authors, Frisch is known for exploring the politically-charged themes of the 
postwar era in his work, particularly the writing he produced during his middle period 
from 1950-70 (Kilcher 78). Despite the extremely robust scholarship on his body of work 
and the widespread uptake many of his pieces experience, with his plays and novels, such 
as Stiller (1954) and Homo Faber (1957), regularly appearing on best-seller lists, in 
school curricula, and in foreign markets as methods for the introduction to the German-
language literary canon (Stephan 1), “even today, little research has been done on 
Frisch’s literary debut,” Jürg Reinhart (Unser 96). Indeed, aside from a single article 
discussing the racist and anti-Semitic stereotypes present in the Istanbul chapter, even the 
problematic aspects of the novel seem to have gone uninvestigated by the academic 
community (96).  
This lack of scholarly attention is quite interesting, as despite Frisch’s negative 
feelings about the novel, Jürg Reinhart was generally well-received in its time, with it 
being praised as “außergewöhnlich frisch” in its style by Hellmut Schlien in Die Literatur 
(44). Additionally, Robert Faesi, Eduard Korrodi and Hugo Marti, writing in the Basler 
Zeitung, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Der Bund, respectively, each published 
favourable reviews of the novel (cf. Schütt 147, 174; Unser 96). Furthermore, the novel 
was awarded the Swiss Schiller Foundation’s prize, given in support of talented Swiss 
authors, in 1935 (Schweizerische Schillerstiftung). However, despite the novel’s overall 
positive reception and his own positive assessment of the work, Eduard Korrodi, as the 
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then-literary editor of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, refused to serialize it, as he was 
convinced the novel would not succeed among the younger generation (Schütt 150).  
Coming from a more aesthetic perspective on the text, the genre of the novel 
remains an interesting point. The story, ostensibly centred on the eponymous main 
character’s quest to grow up and “become a man,” suggests a classification as an 
Entwicklungsroman, or perhaps a Bildungsroman; certainly, the novel’s focus on Jürg’s 
personal development is much in line with the definition of the Entwicklungsroman, in 
that it, “in [einer] sehr bewußter und sinnvoller Komposition und [chronologischen] 
Aufbau den inneren und äußeren Werdegang [eines] jungen Menschen von den Anfängen 
bis zu [einer] gewissen Reifung […] darstellt” (Wilpert 215). However, this being said, 
the novel does not quite fit the model of the typical Entwicklungsroman. As Jürgen 
Petersen notes in his book on the author, one could categorize Jürg Reinhart as an 
Entwicklungsroman on the basis of the subject of its main narrative, despite the fact that 
the novel takes place over only approximately half a year, the protagonist is not always 
accompanied by the narrator, and the middle part of the novel focuses on the illness of a 
secondary character rather than the development of the protagonist (23). 
The aforementioned apparent lack of scholarly interest aside, the novel’s 
engagement “in philosophical speculation about a controversial topic” (Unser 94), that is, 
assisted dying, is primarily why I wish to examine Jürg Reinhart in this project. 
Engaging with a prewar text, written at a time when the concept of assisted suicide was 
not associated with the euthanasia program of the Third Reich, will, in comparing it with 
contemporary representations burdened by history, allow me to gain some insight into the 
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differences and similarities in the Swiss literary treatment of assisted suicide between 
these periods. 
Moving to the more contemporary of our two authors, Lukas Bärfuss is the author 
of the second text I wish to consider in this project, Alices Reise in die Schweiz. Bärfuss’ 
work has, over the years, taken on increasingly volatile and sensitive subjects, with the 
previously-named theatre piece tackling the theme of assisted suicide and two of his 
novels, Hundert Tage (2008) and Öl (2009), engaging with the themes of genocide and 
the exploitation of poor countries, respectively (Behrens 1). As Bärfuss is a relatively 
new author, currently emerging in the German-language literary consciousness, his body 
of work is neither especially canonical nor extensively researched. Exceptions to this 
would be, in addition to an article by Thomas Bühler on Alices Reise in die Schweiz that I 
discuss below and the use of the play as a representative piece of contemporary literature 
on its subject by Caroline Welsh in her above-discussed article, the work done by Paul 
Michael Lützeler (2009) and Heinrich Placke (2011) on Hundert Tage and by Sinéad 
Crowe (2013) and Peter Kelting (2009) on Der Bus (2005) (Forschungsliteratur 
[Auswahl]). Alices Reise in die Schweiz, however, also received significant attention in 
the German-language press, which I move to discuss in the next paragraphs. 
As Bärfuss’ work is a stage play, critics have assessed it primarily in terms of its 
stage productions. Reviews in the Feuilleton sections of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung examined the premiere 
performance of the piece in Basel, Switzerland, in March 2005 (Halter; Müller; 
Schlienger), and a later piece in the Ärzte Zeitung evaluated the premiere in Kiel, 
Germany, one year later (Frohnmeyer). These reviews follow much the same vein, in that 
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they view Alices Reise in die Schweiz as a piece that helps the theatre to function once 
more as a forum for the intelligent discussion of an issue of contemporary importance – 
complex though the assisted dying debate may be, complicated as it is by issues of 
autonomy and morality. These sentiments were echoed years later, as the play received 
further attention in the newspaper L’Echo, this time on the occasion of its 2014 premiere 
in Brussels, Belgium (Roisin). Having been translated into French for this series of 
showings, the continued interest shown in Bärfuss’ work underscores the importance and 
continued relevance of conversations around assisted dying.  
Although the staging of the work, varying as it has between the various 
productions of the play, is undoubtedly important to its treatment and reception, it is the 
text, the dialogue, which this project will consider; as the text is constant, it serves as the 
vehicle for the discussions presented within (and without) the theatre. One could of 
course argue that it is through staging that the text can truly engage with the cultural 
discourse. However, as each staging is in itself an interpretation of the text, I wish to 
restrict my focus to the text, so as to engage with that which forms the basis for a 
particular staging and its impact. 
Additionally, to approach the play from a more theoretical angle, Thomas Bühler 
chose Alices Reise in die Schweiz as the focus for his 2007 article, “Die Praxis schlägt 
zurück.” He argues for Bärfuss’ work being an example of a play that straddles the 
boundary between traditional and contemporary drama, one that takes the problem of this 
dichotomy to heart and “in der Theaterpraxis zur Entwicklung neuer Formen führt, die 
sich einer dichotomen Klassifikation Tradition/Innovation verweigern [will]” (Bühler 
45). Just as the drama seeks “in paradoxer Situation weder die Antwort noch eine 
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endzeitspielgemäße Lösung” to the question of assisted dying (48), it fits neither within 
the confines of traditional theatre nor modern drama; the play could in fact, argues 
Bühler, be “weniger als Neuerung im Sinne eine Ablösung von alten Formen, sondern 
mehr als eine Variante im Nebeneinander verschiedener Formen” (50). 
Having discussed the social and political contexts around assisted dying, the 
dominant theoretical approach to the theme, and the research and literary contexts 
surrounding my chosen texts, it can be seen that there is a relatively small body of 
research and otherwise on this topic. However, what exists remains significant for this 
project, in that it grounds the project within a constantly evolving socio-cultural 
discourse; accordingly, I now wish to position this thesis project in reference to several 
key factors. Firstly, while work on the dominant theoretical approach to assisted dying 
and on assisted dying in German-language literature until 1935 has been done, my chosen 
texts, Jürg Reinhart and Alices Reise in die Schweiz, have not been considered in this 
context. Additionally, in applying a Foucauldian approach that emphasizes the influence 
of discourse to a subject-focused topic, in this case assisted dying, one is able to 
determine the role and influence of discourse on the topic, despite the typical focus on the 
individual in discussions about assisted dying. This results in a deeper understanding of 
the topic, and in the case of assisted dying, provides insights on the difficulties facing the 
practice and its implementation. Accordingly, in this thesis project I seek to combine the 
aforementioned texts with a methodological approach that is rooted in Foucauldian 
genealogy, which I will develop and advocate for in the following chapter. 
I do this firstly with the intent of providing a unique approach to the analysis of 
literary works concerned with a topic of particular contemporary significance, and 
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secondly to highlight the importance of discussing literature that takes on themes of 
social significance. Due to literature’s dialectical relationship with public discourse, in 
that literature is both informed by and informs the public discourse, studying literature 
that approaches these topics, here assisted dying, affords a greater understanding of how 
they shape and are shaped by discourse. 
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology 	  
 In the name of establishing the methods used in the analysis chapters of this 
thesis, this chapter focuses on presenting my methodology in its theoretical context. After 
a brief reiteration of the research questions guiding my analysis, I will present the 
theoretical background upon which my methodology is built, followed by a discussion of 
my methods of analysis. Lastly, I will touch upon the strengths and limitations of my 
approach.	  
As discussed in the introductory chapter, I will compare and contrast how the 
topic of assisted dying is represented in Max Frisch’s Jürg Reinhart and Lukas Bärfuss’ 
Alices Reise in die Schweiz. This inquiry will focus on two particular aspects of the 
works: the portrayals of institutional power and agency. As such, my analysis will 
consider the following research questions: Firstly, how do the works, in light of the 
historical taboo around assisted dying and in reference to portrayals of institutional power 
and agency, explore and represent the discourses around assisted dying? And, what are 
the roles of institutional power and agency in the discourses about assisted dying in the 
texts? Secondly, what similarities and differences are present in these representations? 
And, considering that there may or may not be significant changes in how the discourses 
around assisted dying are represented in the works, what differences are there in the 
manner of representation, i.e. how institutional power and agency are represented in the 
texts?	  
In order to consider these questions of power and agency, one must first 
determine a suitable methodological approach for such an undertaking. Accordingly, I 
now move to a consideration of the theoretical texts that inform my methodology. I begin 
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here by addressing Michel Foucault’s concepts of the institution and biopower, as 
explored in his works Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975) and The 
History of Sexuality: An Introduction (1978), which I will primarily use to investigate the 
representations of institutional power as found within my chosen texts. In connection 
with this, I will then address contributions from J. L. Austin, Louis Althusser, and Judith 
Butler. In the latter part of this discussion, I will again turn to the work of Judith Butler, 
whose idea of performativity informs my methodology for the examination of instances 
of agency in the texts. By utilizing a theoretical framework informed by the above texts 
for my examination of the representations of power and agency in the works, I will distill 
the similarities and differences between these representations. Additionally, as this 
analysis will rely on examinations in relation to the discourses around assisted dying, use 
of this framework promises to produce insights on how these discourses are presented in 
the works and their interactions. 	  
As suggested by the discussion of the relationship between Foucauldian concepts 
and the broader assisted suicide debate in the previous chapter, Foucault’s ideas form a 
central part of the theoretical background that informs my methodological approach. To 
begin, biopower, as Foucault named “the set of mechanisms through which the basic 
biological features of the human species became the object of […] a general strategy of 
power” in his 1977-78 lecture series, Security, Territory, Population (1), refers to all of 
the technologies, knowledges, and discourses that are used to regulate and manage the 
state’s human resources; “biopower analyzes, regulates, controls, explains, and defines 
the human subject, its body and behaviour” (Danaher ix). This control is effectively a re-
interpretation or extension of the sovereign’s power over life and death; “the right of 
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sovereignty was the right to take life or let live […] this new right is […] the right to 
make live and to let die” (Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 241). As stated in The 
History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Foucault considered the evolution of various 
“disciplines,” such as universities and public health, that in one manner or another 
focused on “the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations” as indicative of an 
“era of ‘bio-power’” (140). Essentially, the aim of biopower is to control bodies through 
the regulation of life, in that it manages the reproduction, illnesses, and deaths of a 
population.	  
Institutional power, on the other hand, can be understood as the regulatory, 
normalizing power of the institution, defined as “a relatively enduring and stable set of 
relationships between different people, and between people and objects” (36), on the 
individual. In the context of biopower, institutions concerned with individuals’ bodies 
and their manner of life and death, such as hospitals or prisons, exercise this power. This 
(institutional) power “disciplines” the individual, forcing upon them a normalizing 
influence that serves to form their subjectivies to the benefit of existing power structures; 
as Foucault notes in Discipline and Punish, “discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the 
specific technique of a power that regards individuals as both objects and as instruments” 
(170). By accepting the normalizing influence of the institution, the individual, in acting 
according to set norms, reiterates the discourse and empowers the institution; however, 
resistance to this power is possible, and has subversive potential, but is nonetheless 
inherent in the discursive system. Naturally, when one considers questions of assisted 
dying, this discursive influence becomes all too apparent. In this context, the health care 
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institution becomes not only a regulator of health and continued life, but also one of 
death, determining the correct or acceptable methods and modes of dying.	  
As my analysis will be based on a close textual reading, I will be focusing 
primarily on the activities and dialogues of the characters in the works, highlighting those 
utterances or actions that are productive of subjecthood within the healthcare framework. 
Additionally, in examining these productions, I will pay special consideration to 
accompanying instances of resistance to this productive power. This resistance could, for 
example, be found in a protagonist’s choice to seek assistance in ending their life in the 
face of incurable illness, resisting the institutional norms of entering into the healthcare 
system for extensive, perhaps ineffective, treatment or end-of-life care. However, it is 
important to remember that this resistance also constitutes the acceptance of or 
subscription to another, albeit subversive, discourse: in this case, the discourse around 
assisted dying.	  
The theoretical works of J. L. Austin, Louis Althusser, and Judith Butler provide a 
fitting framework to examine the actions and dialogues of the characters in my chosen 
texts. Utterances or actions that create particular subjectivities, or, phrased otherwise, 
“acts of construction,” follow Austin’s definition of performative utterances (Austin 5) 
and Althusser’s concept of the interpellation of the subject (Althusser 163). Austin 
categorizes performative utterances, or simply performatives, as lacking a truth-value and 
as utterances that, in the appropriate circumstances, not only say something, but do it as 
well (5), exercising a degree of power. An example of this would be the exchange of 
vows during a wedding; upon saying “I do,” one not only verbally states one’s intention 
to be married to another, one also becomes married. 	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Butler builds on this idea with her concept of performativity, understood as “the 
reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” 
(Bodies That Matter 2), in so far as the actions, including speech acts, performed by an 
agent serve as simultaneous production and regulation of their identities, in connection 
with regulatory discourses. According to Butler, there is no preexisting identity for the 
individual; rather, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that 
are said to be its results” (Gender Trouble 25). Accordingly, actions performed within a 
regulatory framework of norms both carry out an immediate function and serve to 
construct an individual’s identity; the subject is, in effect, “doing” their identity.	  
Speech acts can also be directed towards another person, resulting in what 
Althusser calls interpellation of the subject (174). In explaining his ideas concerning the 
relationship between ideology and the subject, Althusser utilizes the example of a police 
officer calling to a passerby. In hearing the officer shout, “Hey you there!”, the person 
responds by acknowledging the call and turning around. In doing this, this person 
becomes a subject, in that they recognize themselves as being the subject of the officer’s 
(speech) act (163). It follows, then, that subjecthood can be, at least in part, thrust upon 
one individual by another through language, along with all of the assumed characteristics 
of that subject. Accordingly, as literature can be understood as a system of language, it 
follows that the dialogue present in a text is not only representative of speech, but also of 
speech acts; in speaking with one another, characters in a text are in fact performing 
speech acts, constructing themselves and one another as certain kinds of subjects. 
Through this evidently productive power, speech acts can also be seen as an expression 
of compliance with or resistance to established norms.	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Considering these observations, I will compare the discourses present in Jürg 
Reinhart with those in Alices Reise in die Schweiz in order to determine how institutional 
power is presented in the texts, and the similarities and differences in these 
representations. I will do this by first analyzing and contrasting the individual 
representations of power relations in each text, formed as they are through the process 
that is the text. Then, I will compare the representations in general from the first text with 
those of the second, focusing on the representations of these discourses as they are shown 
by the utterances and actions of the characters.	  
 My methodology will allow for a text-based, character-focused analysis that 
nonetheless takes into account the discourses at work in the texts. This is particularly 
valuable when one considers the topic of assisted dying, in so far as the assisted suicide 
debate is intensely personal and focused on the well being of the individual, all the while 
being located at the intersection of discourses that inform and construct not only an 
individual’s experience of the issue, but create certain forms of subjecthood within the 
regulatory frameworks. Thus, by focusing primarily on the acts of the individuals in these 
works, as seen through the discourses that surround assisted dying, this project can reach 
conclusions about the representations of these discourses in the text, which take into 
account the experience of the individual in the context of discursive frameworks.	  
The second part of my methodology is derived from Butler’s idea of 
performativity, introduced in her 1993 work as “the reiterative power of discourse to 
produce the phenomena that it regulates” (2). After using Foucault’s concept of biopower 
to distill how and what forms of institutional power are present in the texts, I will use the 
concept of performativity to assess the representations of agency in the texts. Holding 
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that performativity is, in essence, the idea that the iterative performance of actions, 
dictated by a regulatory framework produces subjecthood, I will conduct an analysis 
focusing on instances in the texts that show the characters’ actions in relation to 
regulating discourses, represented as they are in the text. These actions could be in 
accordance with discourse, i.e. as prescribed by discursive norms, or function as 
resistance/subversion to those norms in some way, itself produced by discourse. 	  
In order to meaningfully categorize these actions and dialogues, I will be using a 
specific definition of ‘agency’, built on Butler’s aforementioned concept of 
performativity. For the purposes of my analysis, an ‘agent’ will be a character that is 
constructed in a certain way by the regulatory and productive discourses present in the 
text, but acts against this construction; in essence, performs an act of resistance. If a 
character is portrayed in the text in this way, this character can be said to have a degree of 
‘agency’. Accordingly, throughout this project, ‘agency’ is considered to be when a 
subject consciously acts against the discourses constructing it, performing an act of 
resistance to the discursive norms that govern its conduct. It is important to note that this 
resistance is not an act independent from discursive influence; just as discourse prescribes 
norms, it is also productive of the resistance to those norms.	  
Additionally, speech act theory, as introduced above in the context of work by 
Althusser, Austin, and Butler, plays a role in my examination of agency in my chosen 
texts. As speech acts can have the effect of constructing an individual as a certain kind of 
subject, as indicated in the discussion of the theoretical underpinnings for my analysis of 
the representations of institutional power, this act of construction may well be an act of 
resistance in itself. Accordingly, I wish to extend my criteria for the determination of 
   
	   31	  
agency. For the purposes of this analysis, the characters that can be seen to perform acts 
of resistance, including speech acts, that either construct other characters or the acting 
character as being other than the prevailing discourse dictates, can be said to possess a 
degree of agency. By considering agency in this way, this analysis will lead to a fuller 
understanding of what it means for one to have a kind of agency within a discursive 
framework. These understandings can then give rise to a greater knowledge of the role of 
agency in conversations about assisted dying in general.	  
Having considered the theoretical grounding and intended usage of my 
methodological approach, I now wish to discuss the possible limitations of these 
methods; chiefly, what sort of insights the methodology is equipped to produce. My 
methodology, geared as it is to an analysis of literary works, is firmly rooted in textual 
analysis. Accordingly, when I write about discourse, I am referring to the discourses as 
they are presented or represented in the texts; in this case, the literary discourse around 
assisted dying, as shown in Alices Reise in die Schweiz and Jürg Reinhart. Although 
literary discourse influences public discourse, and vice versa, the two should not be 
conflated. Owing to this, the project does not claim to produce insights on the social 
discourses around assisted dying; rather, this work is limited to an analysis of the 
representations of the discourses around assisted dying and the production of deeper 
understandings thereof. 
 This chapter has, in considering the theoretical background of my methodological 
approach and discussing the use, appropriateness, and limitations of said approach, 
sought to present and establish the methods with which the analysis of my chosen texts 
was conducted. I utilize a text-analysis approach that attempts to examine both 
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representations of agency and of institutional power in the works, while attempting to 
maintain the importance of normalizing discourses in the existence of those 
representations. I argue that, in doing this, my methodological approach produces fuller 
understandings of these phenomena as they exist in the texts, leading to further insight 
into the function of the discourses around assisted dying in general.	  
Accordingly, the next chapter of this thesis project opens the analysis portion, 
where I begin with Max Frisch’s Jürg Reinhart, examining the portrayals of agency and 
institutional power involved in the latter half of the novel, where Frisch describes the 
events surrounding Jürg and his terminally ill beloved, Inge. 
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Chapter 4.1: Jürg Reinhart 
 
Introduction 
 
Frisch’s debut novel tells the story of Jürg Reinhart, a young man from 
Switzerland who embarks on a somewhat aimless journey of self-discovery as he seeks to 
become a man and find his purpose in life; as described at the beginning of the novel, 
“was man sonst von Jürg Reinhart wußte, nachdem er die dritte Woche in Ragusa geweilt 
hatte, war ungefähr nichts. Das heißt: daß er jung war und sich auf einer Reise befand. 
Aber unklar, woher er kam und wohin er wollte” (Frisch, 227-28). As mentioned here, his 
travels eventually take him to a guesthouse in Ragusa, modern-day Dubrovnik, where he 
stays for a period, meeting and becoming enmeshed in the lives of the impoverished 
Baroness von Woerlach, the manager of the guesthouse, her chronically ill daughter Inge, 
and a number of other guests.  
After a number of less than successful attempts at pursuing romantic engagements 
with other women at the guesthouse, Jürg becomes closer with Inge, the femme fragile, 
falling in love with her. In one of their conversations, Jürg expresses his uncertainty with 
life, declaring that “dieses Erwachsenwerden ist ein Verblöden. […] manchmal habe ich 
so irrsinnige Angst vor dem Erwachsenwerden. Begreifen Sie das? Ich möchte endlich 
reifer werden, zugleich aber ein Kind bleiben” (275). His uncertain feelings aside, Jürg 
eventually decides to leave the guesthouse to continue his travels, and in spite of Inge’s 
request that he stay, leaves for Athens. Shortly after departing, Jürg reaches the 
realization that,  
Man wird nicht Mann durch die Frau. […] nun muß [er] einen weiten Umweg  
machen, um richtig zur Frau zurückzukommen, einen Umweg durchs Alleinsein  
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und eine menschliche Bewährung, die man durch den Geist erringt und nicht im  
leiblichen Mannsein sucht. […] Und erst, wenn ich mir dies bewiesen habe,  
nämlich durch eine männliche Tat […] Dann werde ich diese Hemmung besiegt  
haben, […] als man seine Reife durch die Frau suchte, zugleich wissend, daß man  
sie in der Frau nicht finden wird. (305) 
With this realization guiding him, Jürg travels on, through Istanbul to Greece, searching 
for his “männliche Tat” (305). However, while in Greece, Jürg receives word from 
Ragusa of Inge’s deteriorating health. Hearing of her plight, Jürg changes his plans, 
heading back to the guesthouse, where he is faced with the “männliche Tat” (305) he had 
sought, as he is forced to make the most difficult decision of his young life: whether or 
not to help Inge end her suffering. 
Jürg Reinhart presents a narrative that, while being at the same time very much 
focused on the personal development of the eponymous main character and reminiscent 
of the prototypical Entwicklungsroman, provides an extremely intimate look at a topic of 
contemporary importance: assisted dying. The novel offers a close look at the moral and 
emotional challenges that characterize interactions with processes of (assisted) dying, and 
owing to its date of publication, does so in a manner unfettered by negative associations 
with the Third Reich’s euthanasia program. Accordingly, the novel explores not only the 
personal experiences of the characters as they grapple with the implications of helping 
someone to die, but also lays open the discursive frameworks within which the process 
occurs, such as those constructed by juridical and religious discourses. 
Despite the discursive frameworks within which assisted dying exists, individual 
agency remains a guiding principle in present-day discussion around the topic; as such, in 
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examining the portrayal of assisted dying in Jürg Reinhart, this chapter will also seek to 
explore how the novel portrays the individual’s ability to make autonomous decisions. 
Accordingly, in the following pages I will consider the regulatory frameworks that 
govern assisted dying as they are presented in Jürg Reinhart by analyzing the text’s 
depictions of agency and institutional power, as well as the interaction of these 
frameworks with the characters. Consequently, I argue that the novel presents assisted 
dying as existing in a regulatory framework that intersects with manifestations of 
biopower, while foregrounding the potential for personal agency within this context. To 
do this, I will show how discourses of institutional power are reflected in the text and 
investigate the sort of agency characters are depicted as having within these frameworks.  
Accordingly, my analysis of the novel is largely concentrated on the second and 
third books of the text, as the subject of assisted dying does not become a focus of the 
novel until Inge’s health deteriorates midway through the narrative. With this 
concentration in mind, a large portion of the following analysis concerns itself with the 
character of the Baroness, who, while certainly being a major character in the novel, can 
be seen as secondary to the eponymous protagonist. However, despite her status as a 
“secondary” character, I argue that her proximity to the question of assisted dying in the 
novel, achieved through her extensive advocacy for her daughter, which I address below, 
constitutes her as a character of particularly high importance for this analysis. 
The Institution – Medicine 
 To begin with my analysis, I turn now to the depiction of institutional power in 
the text. In Jürg Reinhart, there are several dominant institutional discourses at work, 
primarily the juridical, the medical, and the clerical, in addition to the underlying 
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humanist discourses of personal choice and autonomy. These discourses, taken together, 
form the framework within which the novel poses questions of assisted dying.  
 In Frisch’s novel, this institutional framework is particularly evident in the 
character Inge’s categorization by the medical institution. Throughout the novel, Inge, 
known alternately as die Kranke, is, to varying degrees, constructed as an ill person, 
lacking in personal autonomy. Specifically, Inge is conceptualized as a sick person who 
does not have authority over her own life in many respects; she has no authority over her 
own treatment, and by extension her continued life and eventual death. 
 Early in the novel, living with her mother the Baroness in the guesthouse, Inge is 
in many respects portrayed as a fairly “normal,” even unremarkable character, with Jürg’s 
initial attentions being directed towards Hilde, the guesthouse maid. Eventually, however, 
the characters begin to spend more time with one another, becoming quite close by the 
time Jürg leaves to continue on his journey. In fact, as he says his goodbyes, Jürg and 
Inge kiss, a rather significant event in the young man’s life, as “es war das erstemal 
gewesen, daß er einer Frau, außer seiner Mutter, einen Kuß gegeben hatte” (301).  
Despite the not immediately threatening nature of Inge’s illness and the relatively 
mundane nature of her existence at her mother’s guesthouse, Inge clearly conceptualizes 
herself as being fragile and lacking full capacity for physical activity, based on her status 
as an ill person. During one of their interactions, prior to Jürg’s departure, Inge goes to 
fetch the two of them glasses of punch, “und als Inge ein neues Glas füllte, dachte sie: 
Nun geht er nach Stambul und Griechenland, aber sie war meistens krank gewesen, wenn 
sie hätte reisen mögen” (259). Although she is not explicitly designated as being 
chronically or seriously ill by a physician at this point in the text, rather being referred to 
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and referring to herself as die Kranke or eine Kranke, Inge nonetheless conceptualizes her 
previous illness as a limiting factor on her actions; simply, her status as an ill person, a 
status afforded to her by, at minimum, common understandings of what the medical 
institution prescribes as “ill,” has the effect of regulating her behaviour. 
This regulatory influence is again seen as Jürg seeks to leave the guesthouse to 
continue on his journey. Inge, having become quite attached to Jürg, asks if he will 
instead stay with them: 
Seien Sie unser Gast. Wissen Sie: ohne Fremdheiten. So wie wir Gäste hatten,  
als wir unser Gut noch besaßen. […] Auch wenn ich Ihnen kein Reitpferd geben  
kann, nicht einmal Hunde: Ich bitte Sie darum, Jürg, seien Sie trotzdem unser  
Gast.” […] Endlich legte [Jürg] diese Platte nieder, um näherzutreten, als ihm  
Inge schon die voraussichtliche Dankrede aus dem Mund nahm: “Ich bin krank  
und kann Ihnen keine Rechnung schreiben.” (290)  
Inge’s last comment serves only to emphasize her status as an ill person; she, being 
chronically ill, does not have the authority to write Jürg his bill to allow him to leave the 
guesthouse. Although it is perhaps not unusual for an unmarried young woman to be 
unable to write a bill of sale, Inge places this deficiency squarely on the shoulders of her 
illness; due to her status as an ill person, she conceptualizes herself as being unable to do 
certain things. So strong is her perception of her illness categorizing her as less-than, she 
even makes a point of saying to Jürg how little she can offer him; she is not the owner of 
the guesthouse who has the authority to write bills, just “eine Kranke.” Indeed, Inge even 
sees her illness as constructing her as being character-deficient; as she states shortly after 
offering Jürg permanent residence at the guesthouse, “‘wie gemein man wird, Jürg, wenn 
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man krank ist: nun gebe ich Ihnen Kuchen, damit Sie nachher nicht schwimmen können 
und hierbleiben müssen. […] oh doch, Jürg, so sind die Kranken’” (290). Effectively, the 
medical institution categorizes persons with illnesses as “sick,” and accordingly, in a 
category apart from “well” or “normal.” This leads Inge to conceptualize herself as 
“abnormal.” She sees herself not merely as a “normal” person with an illness, but as 
someone who is fundamentally “other” than a person who is “well.” Accordingly, Inge 
acts out the part of the “other” by conceptualizing herself as unable to offer the man she 
loves that which a “well” person could, on the grounds of her illness. 
 Naturally, Inge’s regulation by the medical institution extends to and beyond the 
point at which she falls gravely ill. After Inge’s health deteriorates and she is brought to 
the hospital for treatment, her categorization by the medical institution as an ill person 
results in a near-stripping of her personal autonomy, as nearly all decisions pertaining to 
her treatment are taken out of her hands, an example of this being when she refuses an 
injection, but it is administered regardless of her wishes (340-41). As the institution 
categorizes Inge’s body as unwell, her mind is considered suspect as well, and her wishes 
are not heeded. As Hilde, the guesthouse maid, comes to the hospital to visit Inge, she 
wonders to herself, “vielleicht weiß es die Kranke nicht, daß jemand im Zimmer steht” 
(317), questioning the mental state of her sick empolyer. 
Additionally, shortly after being brought to the hospital, the doctors come to the 
conclusion that Inge will need an operation to have a chance at surviving her illness; 
however, Inge is not consulted about this course of action, the decision being left to her 
mother and the attending physicians (320). Due to her physical illness, Inge is simply not 
   
	   39	  
considered mentally well enough to be involved in her own treatment plan, or even the 
specifics of her diagnosis. As Hilde asks Inge during her visit, 
“Was haben Sie eigentlich, gnädiges Fräulein?” 
“Man sagt mir nichts.” (318) 
Inge is continuously reminded of her state as the pitiable sick woman by her treatment as 
a patient, yet is so disconnected from the specifics of her treatment that she simply does 
not know what is going to happen, or what has happened to her already. Continuing their 
conversation, Inge asks Hilde, 
 “Sagen Sie es aufrichtig, Hilde.” 
 “Ja?” 
 “Hat man mich eigentlich schon operiert?” 
 Und Hilde schüttelt heftig den Kopf, lange, damit man ihre Augen nicht sehe, die  
wieder feucht geworden sind; denn nun begreift sie etwas, plötzlich, sie weiß ein  
Geheimnis. (318) 
Inge is so strongly regulated by the medical institution that her illness becomes her only 
defining characteristic. She is physically ill, and so cannot handle the mental burden of 
knowledge about her own situation; she is produced in a separate category that strips her 
of her personal autonomy. 
 Perhaps the most dramatic instance of this categorization of Inge as sick and 
therefore incompetent by the medical institution takes place following the operation her 
survival depended on. While the operation was, as Dr. Svilos thinks, “die schlimmste 
Operation gewesen, die er erlebt hat” (336), Inge survives. Despite this success, Inge 
remains ill, eventually developing acutely painful blood poisoning (365), and naturally 
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continues to be regulated by the medical institution as a sick individual, without the 
ability to make choices about her treatment. This continued regulation is perhaps most 
clearly seen following Inge’s assignment to a new hospital room, a room that Drs. Heller 
and Svilos, her attending physicians, thought would have a positive psychological effect 
on their patient (337). Inge flies into a sudden rage, railing against the physicians and her 
family alike for failing to help her:  
“Nicht mitzittern, Freundin, warum helfen Sie nicht? Niemand hat Kraft! 
Niemand? […]” 
“Aber liebes Kind, du hast doch mich.” 
Auf den Bettrand hat sich die Mutter gesetzt. 
“Ich brauche dich nicht, Mutti. Du hast auch keine Kraft. Du kannst mir auch 
nicht helfen, Mutti. Du läßt mich sterben wie einen Hund.” (339) 
Inge eventually breaks down, frustrated and crying, wishing only for her beloved, 
Jürg, to be by her side; Svilos takes this opportunity to do what he has determined is best 
for his patient, that is, sedate her: 
Jetzt, als sich Svilos nähert, bittet die Kranke mit stummen und entsetzten Augen: 
Keine Einspritzungen machen! Aber [die Krankenschwester] reicht das 
Instrument. Und Inges aufgerissener Blick sinkt auf die Mutter: Schlage sie, Mutti, 
schlage sie! Aber es nützt nichts: die Nadel berührt den bloßgelegten Arm. Und 
dann weint Inge: Warum läßt du mich im Stich, Mutti, warum rufst du nicht Jürg? 
Inzwischen drückt Svilos langsam und bis zur zweiten Marke, die man am 
Glasröhrchen sieht. (340-41) 
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Inge is categorized as physically ill and therefore, as a mental invalid; she has neither 
authority over her medical treatment, or even over her own body, as her mother and the 
attending physicians make all decisions pertaining to her treatment, even sedating her 
against her will. In fact, Svilos not only makes Inge’s healthcare decisions for her, he 
violates her body in carrying those decisions out, compromising Inge’s basic authority 
over her own body. Thusly, Inge finds herself regulated by the medical institution, to the 
point that her course of action in dealing with her illness is fully in the hands of those 
around her, who subscribe to the norms set out by medical discourse. 
The Institution – Religion 
 Although the medical institution’s regulation of Inge as a patient can be found 
throughout the novel, and its resulting influence on the situation is nothing short of 
pervasive, it is of course not the only source of discursive influence. Continuing my 
analysis of the institutional influence present in Jürg Reinhart, I now turn to the treatment 
of religious authority; while by no means as ubiquitous as evidence of Inge’s regulation 
by the medical institution, religious discourse plays a vital role in shaping how the 
characters approach Inge’s treatment.  
Later in the novel, after it has become clear that Inge will die from her illness, her 
mother, the Baroness, confronted with the imminent death of her daughter, finds herself 
faced with the reality of the situation in that neither she, nor the doctors, can do anything 
to save Inge. She is, however, not content to merely sit idly by, demanding of Svilos,  
“Aber wir müssen einfach helfen. Auch wenn wir uns nicht vorstellen können, 
was wir tun: Liebe war niemals ein Irrtum […] Warum schweigt ihr alle? Ihr 
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wollt mich nicht verstehen […] muß ich es selber aussprechen? Ich: die Mutter? 
Lassen Sie mein Kind sterben. Heute.” (343) 
Svilos, however, does not take this suggestion kindly, flatly refusing the Baroness’ 
request: 
“Möge Sie Gott überhört haben, und wir wollen es Ihrer Verzweiflung verzeihen 
und vergessen; denn Sie werden sich darauf besinnen, daß es Ihr eigenes Kind ist.” 
“Und deswegen bitte ich Sie darum.” 
“Sie versündigen sich […] Baronin: ich bin Slawe und treuer Katholik.” 
“Sie erlösen mein Kind nicht?” 
“Ich töte nicht.” 
“Töten, wenn man hilft, töten, wenn man erlöst?” 
“Es ist bloß einer, dem das Recht des Erlösens gehört, und das ist unser Gott.” 
“Und er hilft nicht!” 
“Baronin: ich achte Ihren Schmerz, da Sie Ihr letztes Kind wegsterben sehen, aber 
ich teile nicht die Lästerungen einer deutschen Ketzerin.” (344) 
This exchange reveals the underlying influence of Judeo-Christian creed in respect to 
Inge’s treatment, as the religious institution’s normative influence, manifested in Svilos’ 
adamant refusal to help Inge die and his resultant shaming, or disciplining, of the 
Baroness. The text presents Svilos as a “treuer Katholik” (344), and thus as a subscriber 
to and representative of the norms prescribed by the church, and in so being, as a subject 
to the regulating effects of the dominant religious institution. The norms set out by the 
church, then, fundamentally limit and regulate Svilos’ conduct; simply, if he is to be a 
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“true Catholic,” he must act according to the Catholic Church’s statutes, including 
refusing to condone assisting in another’s suicide.  
Naturally, in responding to the Baroness’ request to help her daughter die, Svilos 
acts according to the church’s mandate that one shall not kill, and refuses to entertain the 
idea of killing Inge. The Baroness, however, challenges this norm by reconceptualizing 
the act of ending her daughter’s life as deliverance from her pain, rather than as an 
immoral act. When Svilos maintains that deliverance is the province of God, again 
cementing himself firmly within the discursive influence of the church, the Baroness 
continues to challenge the authority of the church in this realm, criticizing God’s seeming 
absence; in response, Svilos brands her a heretic and leaves the Baroness without his help. 
By refusing to help the Baroness on religious grounds, Svilos makes clear the discursive 
influence of the religious institution on the situation; he raises neither ethical nor legal 
grounds for refusing to help Inge die, seemingly basing his decision purely on his 
religious beliefs. Thusly, the text presents the influence of the religious institution as a 
regulating force in relation to Inge’s plight. 
This is of course not the only instance of religious discourses influencing 
interactions in relation to the question of whether or not to help Inge end her life. After 
the Baroness’ request is rejected by Svilos, she turns to Helen, a friend of the family, for 
help: 
“Helen: ist es Töten, wenn man es aus Liebe tut? Wir sind Menschen, die zusehen 
und ein Gefühl haben: und nicht die Kraft? […] mein Kind ruft nach Kraft, und 
das ist Liebe […] und heute ist dieser Tag, da wir sie einlösen sollen […] wir 
werden es erfahren, ob es ein Gott der Liebe ist. Ob es ein Töten war oder ein 
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Helfen. Dann dürfen wir trauern, Helen, weil wir einen Menschen geliebt haben.” 
(345) 
Helen, however, is unconvinced by the Baroness’ words; she rebuffs the Baroness, 
criticizing her lack of hope and apparent misunderstanding of Inge’s situation: 
“Warum sind Sie so grausam, Baronin, so alle Hoffnung leugnend? Und sich 
ausdenken, daß Inge hinausgestoßen wird aus diesem Leben, das ihr vielleicht 
noch so lange zugedacht ist: Mord!” 
 “Mord?” 
 “Verzeihen Sie mir, liebste Baronin, aber denken Sie an alles, was Inge noch  
verlangen darf vom Dasein, und ich glaube nicht, daß soviel Schmerzen ohne 
Sinn sind!” (346) 
Helen’s reasoning for her actions being based on the belief that suffering happening for a 
reason reveals a worldview that is, minimally, influenced by traditional Judeo-Christian 
understandings of suffering as a trial or punishment from God. In rejecting the Baroness’ 
reasons for wanting to help her daughter end her life, and showing her own understanding 
of Inge’s suffering to be based on “truths” about suffering claimed by Christian discourse, 
in that killing is immoral, Helen reveals an undercurrent of discursive influence from the 
institution of religion – and the degree to which her own behaviour is regulated by that 
influence. Thus, the text’s presentation of the Baroness’ interactions with Helen serves to 
portray the religious institution as a source of discursive influence on questions of 
assisted dying. 
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The Institution – Juridical Discourse 
 As seen in the previous sections, involvement with questions of death, illness, and 
assisted dying necessitates exposure to a myriad of regulating discourses. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, one of the most apparent sources of discursive influence, particularly 
when one examines these questions from a contemporary perspective, is that of the legal 
sphere. Indeed, the justice system maintains a high degree of authority over the truths, in 
a Foucauldian sense, of assisted dying, as any legalization or regulation efforts must 
officially be conducted through the legal system. It follows then, that characters in the 
novel look to the legal system to legitimize their own actions in respect to assisted dying, 
as they act either in accordance with or against established norms; accordingly, the last 
facet of institutional influence I now move to consider is that of the juridical. 
 Following the Baroness’ decidedly unsuccessful attempts to solicit help from 
Svilos and Helen, she turns to the second of Inge’s attending physicians, Dr. Heller. The 
Baroness’ thoughts on her daughter’s situation have, despite the resistance shown to her 
ideas by Svilos and Helen, remained much the same; as she tells Heller in asking for his 
assistance, “‘Ich bitte Sie: welchen Sinn hat es, daß wir meinem Kind nicht helfen? […] 
Gott, ich sehe nur diesen einzigen Sinn: daß wir helfen müssen!’” (348). Heller, however, 
does not immediately react to the Baroness’ pleas, prompting her to take a more direct 
tack, which in turn forces Heller to reveal his thoughts on the matter: 
 “Heller: Sie tun es.” 
 “Ich?!” […] 
 “Sie wissen, Baronin, daß wir nicht das Recht dazu haben. Ich meine: nicht das  
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staatliche Recht. Und schon einmal stand ich vor dieser Lage. […] Aber nun ist es 
das zweite Mal, Baronin: wir wollen nicht streiten über das staatliche Gesetz, das 
wir in dieser Stunde nicht ändern können.” (348) 
In responding to the Baroness’ request for help in this way, Heller firmly conceptualizes 
his actions as a physician as being governed under the law; despite any personal feelings 
he may have about the situation, his experience dealing with situations like Inge’s tells 
him that the juridical is the governing discourse in events such as this. As such, Heller’s 
actions in respect to the Baroness’ request are regulated by this discourse.  
Interestingly, despite this regulatory influence, Heller does in fact decide to help 
the Baroness. However, his help comes in a form that the Baroness does not quite expect: 
 “Ich werde mithelfen, Baronin. Ja. vielleicht wissen Sie, daß nachher unbedingt  
eine Untersuchung gemacht werden muß über die eigentliche Todesursache. […]  
Ich gebe Ihnen das Versprechen, daß ich schweige, wenn ich einen Tod feststellen 
sollte, der eine strafbare Verletzung des Gesetzes verrät, und daß ich gegebenfalls 
leugne, wenn andere diese Vermutung aufbringen.” 
“Sie helfen nicht selber?!” 
“Meine Hand, Baronin: es wird niemand, der helfen mag, eine staatliche Strafe 
befürchten müssen.” (349) 
Heller’s act of resistance against the juridical discourse, which I will discuss later in my 
analysis, aside, the form his willingness to help takes suggests the extent to which the 
juridical discourse influences his conduct. He wishes to help, but will do so only in a 
“safer,” less easily punished manner; he will lie about the results of Inge’s autopsy, and 
even goes so far as to provide the Baroness with the tools she needs to aid Inge in her 
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death (“Ich stelle meine Morphiumspritze auf dieses Tischchen, Baronin; meine Mithilfe 
habe ich versprochen, und mein Versprechen werde ich halten” (349)), but he will not 
risk performing the deed himself; the threat of discipline simply cannot be ignored. 
 In the next scene of the novel, after Heller has taken his leave of the Baroness, she 
enters a side room to find the nurse Jovanka. Picking up the syringe Heller left in his 
wake, the Baroness asks Jovanka how to use the device, and eventually asks her to help 
in releasing Inge from her pain. Much as with the other people the Baroness has asked for 
help, this does not go as planned: 
 “Sie sind eine Frau, Jovanka, Sie haben ein Herz.” 
 “Ich bin keine Verbrecherin!” 
 “Sie wissen, was eine Mutter ist. Sie sind Schwester. Sie wissen, wie man es  
macht.” (351) 
Much as Heller’s initial reaction to the Baroness’ plea, Jovanka’s response underscores 
the ever-present influence of the law on the conduct of persons involved with life and 
death situations; her immediate reaction to the Baroness’ request references the power of 
the juridical discourse that disciplines and regulates the behaviours of citizens of a state, 
prescribing certain behaviours as acceptable and others as not, disciplining those who 
deviate and branding them criminals. Furthermore, what is evident in these conversations 
is not just the regulatory influence of the institution, but also the establishment of certain 
“truths” about what a person is or is not, based on their conduct in respect to established 
norms. 
 Interestingly, the exchange between Jovanka and the Baroness references not only 
the regulatory influence of the juridical, but the medical and religious discourses as well. 
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In response to the Baroness’ appeal to Jovanka’s skills as a nurse, Jovanka continues the 
conversation: 
“Glauben Sie, ich will ausgestoßen werden aus der 
Krankenpflegerinnenvereinigung?” 
“Es bleibt ein Geheimnis.” 
“Gott sieht alles!” 
“Jetzt kommt wieder der liebe Gott, alle kommen und keiner hilft!” (351) 
In refusing to help the Baroness, not only does Jovanka reference the possible legal 
consequences of such an action, but also disciplining actions she would likely face from 
her professional organization, the nurse’s union, representative of the medical discourse 
as it is. Additionally, she acknowledges the possible religious consequences of aiding in 
the death of another; God knows everything, and sins do not go unpunished. Should she 
help the Baroness, Jovanka knows that she risks discipline at the hands of the juridical, 
religious, and medical institutions; this knowledge regulates her response to the Baroness’ 
cry for aid, showing the overarching discursive influence of these spheres on situations 
involving assisted dying.  
Agency – The Baroness 
 To begin the second half of my analysis of Jürg Reinhart, I now turn to the 
concept of agency in the novel. I will approach the concept of agency from a post-
structuralist perspective, utilizing the Butlerian idea of performativity to conceptualize 
agency as an iterative performance within the above-referenced regulatory frameworks. 
Accordingly, it is through performative acts that characters are able to display a degree of 
agency. This reliance on the individual’s act places the discourse around assisted dying in 
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direct relation to discourses of self-determination; however, looking at these actions in 
respect to regulatory discursive frameworks allows for a concept of agency that takes into 
account the resulting discursive influence on the individual’s actions. This performance 
of agency figures heavily into the novel, with a number of characters displaying their 
agencies in meaningful ways. As is appropriate to the subject of my investigation, I will 
limit my considerations here to the characters that perform their agencies in respect to 
Inge’s plight. 
 Accordingly, I will first examine the performance of agency carried out by Inge’s 
mother, the Baroness. The Baroness, in her role as her daughter’s advocate, repeatedly 
reconceptualizes the role of the caregiver, including but not limited to the physician, in 
relation to a patient with a terminal illness. Through her repeated requests that those 
around her help her daughter to die, rather than to simply suffer and waste away, the 
Baroness subverts the traditional role of the caretaker by reconceptualizing the act of 
assisting in another’s suicide as a merciful action, an action whose primary purpose is the 
alleviation of suffering, as opposed to ending a life. This is shown throughout the text, as 
each time the Baroness makes a request of another character, she emphasizes that aiding 
Inge in her suicide is helping her daughter, rather than merely ending her life; for 
example, this can be seen in her conversations with Svilos (“Töten, wenn man hilft?” 
[344]) and Heller (“Ich bitte Sie: welchen Sinn hat es, daß wir meinem Kind nicht helfen?” 
[347-48]). As in her other conversations on the subject, her dialogue with Heller is 
prefaced with her conceptualizing the act of assisting in Inge’s death as one based in love, 
and that she “[sieht] nur diesen einzigen Sinn: daß wir helfen müssen!” (348).  
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By framing her requests in terms of their value as “helping actions,” the Baroness’ 
repeated requests conceptualize assisting in a suicide as an action that is grounded in 
discourses of helping one’s fellow man, and as such, an action that ought to be performed 
by those whose role it is to prevent or alleviate the suffering of the severely ill. This 
reconceptualization of assisting in another’s suicide fundamentally alters the mandate of 
a caregiver or physician in these cases, and as such has the effect of subverting the older 
discourses around caring for the dying. Effectively, the Baroness performs her agency by 
subverting the older discourses around caring for the terminally ill and subscribing to a 
different discursive norm, in that she portrays assisting Inge in her death as an act of 
mercy, and categorizes that act, as well as advocating for it, as belonging to the mandates 
of her daughter’s caretakers, herself, as Inge’s mother, included. 
 Although the Baroness repeatedly advocates for her daughter, trying again and 
again to solicit help from her daughter’s caretakers, and in so doing reconceptualizes the 
act of aiding in a patient’s suicide, affecting a subversive shift in the roles of those self-
same caretakers, the Baroness shows little desire to engage in this act herself. Despite her 
strong desire to find someone who will help her daughter, she seems unable to conceive 
of herself as being that person; she does not subscribe to the subversive norm she 
purports to support. 
 After attempting to solicit help from Svilos, Heller, and Helen, each time being 
refused, she turns to Jovanka, her daughter’s nurse. As discussed in the preceding pages, 
Jovanka refuses to help the Baroness for a number of reasons – but it is the solution she 
offers the Baroness that is especially intriguing. Upon refusing to aid Inge in her suicide, 
Jovanka suggests to the Baroness, 
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 “Baronin: warum tun Sie es denn nicht selber?” 
 “Ich?!” 
 “Langsam drücken. Bis zuletzt.” 
 Und die Mutter bleibt stehen, hält das Instrument und hört, wie hinter ihr eine Tür  
ins Schloß gezogen wird, und ist allein. Endgültig und ganz. 
Ich --? (351) 
Jovanka provides the Baroness with an opportunity to help Inge, even giving her the 
professional guidance her position as a nurse allows, but the Baroness cannot find the 
strength to help her daughter herself. This inability to commit to the action she so 
strongly supported represents an unwillingness to identify herself with the subversive 
activities that she, in extolling the act of assisting in a person’s suicide as helping that 
person more than merely ending their life, prescribes as part of the mandate of caretakers 
of the terminally ill. The Baroness does not appear to view, at least in this sense, the roles 
of caretaker and parent as equivalent; she conceptualizes the act of assisting in an ill 
person’s suicide as belonging to the province of the caregiver and not that of the parent, 
despite their commonalities. Thus, while the Baroness performs a kind of agency in 
promoting this action, she never moves from the dominant conception of what it means to 
be a mother of an ill person to the new, subversive conception she proposes; as she 
mentions to Jürg following Inge’s death, “Ich hatte diese Kraft nicht. Und hundertmal 
wiederhole ich ihre drei letzten Tage: diesen Donnerstag und Freitag und Samstag. Ich 
erinnere mich: vorher wünschte ich es einmal und bat die Ärzte darum. Aber sie 
versagten, wie wir alle versagten” (367). 
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Despite the Baroness’ initial display of agency, shown through her advocacy for 
Inge’s right to be helped by her caretakers, the Baroness could not conceptualize herself 
in those same terms; therefore, despite the level of agency she may have shown in the 
subversive promotion of assisted dying as she sought help for her daughter, she never 
transcends the traditional role of the mother of the sick person by taking the responsibility 
for helping her daughter into her own hands, and thus does not continue to perform her 
agency in a meaningful manner, relapsing into dominant behavioural norms. 
Agency – Jürg and Inge 
 Having discussed the manner of agency performed by the Baroness, I turn now to 
the eponymous main character of the novel, Jürg Reinhart, and the woman he loves, Inge. 
Much like the Baroness, Jürg’s performance of agency in respect to Inge’s impending 
death takes an unlikely form; however, his performance takes a completely different form 
than that of Inge’s mother. Jürg spends a large part of the novel at the Baroness’ 
guesthouse, where he eventually forms a strong emotional attachment to Inge, before 
moving on, continuing his journey to “find a purpose in life” and “become a man.” 
Eventually, after reaching Greece and spending a night in Delphi, he sets out to return to 
Ragusa, only to be confronted with his beloved, Inge, bedridden and suffering the effects 
of blood poisoning; the next day, Inge is dead. Jürg stays at the guesthouse a while longer 
to help with administrative matters related to Inge’s passing, before it is eventually 
revealed that it was he who took the young woman’s life.  
This act of compassion represents one of the most striking examples of a 
character’s performance of agency in the novel, in that aiding Inge in ending her life is 
neither something Jürg wished to do, nor truly felt he could; regardless of his feelings 
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about the action, he nevertheless performs it, and in doing so aligns himself with the 
subversive understandings of the caregiver’s role endorsed by the Baroness as she sought 
someone to alleviate her daughter’s suffering. This is shown in the scene prior to when 
Jürg admits to the Baroness that it was he who helped Inge to die. First, Jürg appears to 
be in denial that it was in fact he who ended Inge’s life: 
Es war ihm, als hörte er sie sagen: 
- Nicht die Nerven verlieren, Jürg […]. Aber ich wußte, daß Sie kommen werden, 
und ich schulde Ihnen noch immer meinen Dank, daß Sie mir die Spritze 
herüberreichten vom Nachttisch. - 
- Ich? Ich habe es nicht getan!! - 
- Warum erschrecken Sie, da Sie nicht sehen, Jürg, warum lügen Sie mir 
gegenüber? - 
[…] Aber jetzt hatte sich Jürg hingeworfen und verbarg sein Gesicht, als hätte er 
es erst in diesem Augenblick begriffen, daß er es gewesen war. (378) 
Jürg is clearly uncomfortable with the truth of his actions; indeed, it is his unwillingness 
and guilt that shows how strong the regulatory influence of dominant discourses is here; 
the source of his unease lies in the designation of the actions he contemplates being 
traditionally seen as wrong. In fact, Jürg even believes that he cannot deal with the 
burden of his guilt, as seen when he begs his fantasy of Inge to let him come with her into 
death: 
- Inge, ich habe es getan, und ich mag dieses Leben nicht, wenn es nun alles 
häßlich macht! Warum erlauben Sie mir nicht, daß ich mitkomme? Ich habe nicht 
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das Recht, weiterzuleben under den Augen Ihrer Mutter! Ich bitte Sie darum: 
gehen wir. - (380) 
Despite his apprehensiveness and unwillingness to let Inge go, Jürg eventually 
does help her to die. In his fantasy, this is ultimately portrayed as an act of great love, and 
represents a subversive shift in the designated role of the caretaker of the terminally ill, as 
shown through the reaction of the Baroness to Jürg’s confession: 
Und da stand Jürg vor [der Baronin] und sagte ruhig: 
“Baronin -- ich.” 
Es wuchs eine Stille um dieses Wort […] und beide verweilten im Blick des  
anderen und warteten. Und endlich […] bewegte sich die greise Hand der Mutter  
und glitt der Tischkante entlang, während sie sagte: 
“Wie müssen Sie mein Kind geliebt haben.” (383-84) 
Not only does the Baroness wish to leave the manner and circumstances of her daughter’s 
death “unter der Erde” (383), having as she does no interest in putting the doer of this 
deed before the courts, she conceptualizes the action as one originating in love, absolving, 
at least partially, Jürg of his guilt and legitimizing the new discourse around the care of 
the terminally ill endorsed by Jürg’s actions.  
Although Jürg’s performance of agency constitutes a shift from one set of 
discursive norms to another, specifically from older understandings of how one ought to 
care for the terminally ill to newer, subversive understandings thereof, Jürg’s actions rely 
on his fantasy of Inge’s encouragement and reassurance. Despite Jürg’s discomfort and 
despair in having to help Inge end the “irrsinnige Schmerzen, [die waren] als hätte [sie] 
brennende Kohlen im Leib getragen” (378), Jürg manages to conceptualize his aiding 
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Inge as equivalent to “eine männliche Tat” (305), that deed that Jürg had sought 
throughout his journey to help him become a man. As Inge tells Jürg in his fantasy, 
- […] Aber ich habe gewußt, daß Jürg kommen würde und daß Sie ein Mensch 
sind, der sich sehnte nach einer Tat. Erinnern Sie sich an jenen Abend auf der 
Pergola? […] Und an Ihren innigsten Wunsch, daß Sie einmal sagen könnten: 
Dies oder das habe ich getan! - 
- Und ist das es nun, was ich getan habe? - 
- Und als Sie endlich eintraten, Jürg, als ich sah, daß Sie die Kraft hatten und daß 
es Sterben war, was Sie mir geben würden: - (378-79) 
Later in their conversation, Inge drives her point home with her last words in the fantasy: 
- […] Sie werden nicht nachkommen in den Tod, Jürg, Sie werden leben, und was 
es Ihnen bringen mag, Jürg: sie werden stehn zu Ihrer Tat. Sie werden es nicht 
leugnen, […] daß Sie ein Mann geworden sind. - 
[…] Er spürte ein plötzliches Würgen im Hals, ein Wimmern durch alle Adern, 
und sie würde lachen: 
- Nicht weinen, Liebster, da Sie nun ein Mann sind. - (381-82) 
It is in this encouragement, this conceptualization of helping her to die as a “männliche 
Tat” (305), that Inge, long portrayed as merely an ill body, lacking in personal agency 
and ability to specify her own treatment or, more generally, to choose her own path, is 
ascribed agency by Jürg. In being reconceptualized as not only competent, but as having 
the awareness that she needs help to act out her will, Jürg’s fantasy of Inge represents a 
challenge to the discursive norms that have categorized her as a sick, and therefore 
helpless, invalid throughout the novel, even though the masculinist discourse that 
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bestows the ability to act onto men only (“männliche Tat”) remains unquestioned. 
Nevertheless, through the imaginary conversation, Jürg’s fantasy of Inge can be 
understood as a new conceptualization of what an ill person’s abilities are, and 
accordingly, what their role is in the determination of their treatment; thereby, in leaving 
the older concept of “patienthood” and moving towards this new set of discursive norms 
behind, Jürg ascribes a degree of agency to Inge. 
Through Inge’s role as the suffering patient, she helps Jürg to perform his agency 
by being the one who becomes her saviour by helping her to die. Jürg performs acts of 
resistance against the dominant discourses that define the roles of the caregiver to the 
terminally ill and, through his bestowal of agency on the fantasy-Inge, of the patient 
themselves. Despite Jürg’s initial unwillingness to aid Inge in her death, he ultimately 
does set her free from her suffering, reconceptualizing the role of the caretaker to the 
terminally ill and subverting older discourses around that role. This is, of course, due to 
his ascription of agency to Inge, as he conceptualizes her as rejecting the traditional 
conception of the severely ill as weak and unable to look out for their own interests, 
imagining that she convinced Jürg to help her end her life by reconceptualizing that 
action as a “männliche Tat” (305), an action of positive value. Through these actions the 
two characters perform, or are conceptualized as performing a kind of agency that, 
despite it being enmeshed in options for compliance and resistance inherent in the 
discursive model, is a product of particular actions that result in movement between 
discursive norms. 
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Conclusion 
 Through a consideration of the characters and institutions portrayed in Jürg 
Reinhart, I have attempted to show that the topic of assisted dying exists in a network of 
institutional discourses, and through a consideration of how the characters in the novel 
interact with these discourses, what sort of discursive influence is evident in the text. 
Accordingly, I have also sought to expose acts of resistance against discursive norms by 
the characters, showing their potential as expressions or performances of agency, in order 
to conceptualize assisted dying within a framework that, while acknowledging the 
influence of institutional powers, remains firmly based in humanist discourses of self-
determination.  
Through this examination, I have not only shown the state of the representation of 
assisted dying in Jürg Reinhart, but also exposed the position the novel takes on the 
subject. Despite, though perhaps in part due to, the novel’s concept of assisted dying 
being rooted in pre-World War Two ideas of compassionate euthanasia, the text comes 
out strongly in favour of assisted dying in the context of humanist discourses of self-
determination. Throughout the novel, assisted suicide is conceptualized as being in 
conflict with a variety of discourses, chiefly the medical, juridical, and religious; this is 
shown, for example, in the Baroness’ interactions with her daughter’s caregivers as she 
asks for their help in aiding Inge to die. Through these interactions, the text positions 
assisted dying as a concept apart from and in opposition to established societal norms. In 
doing this, the novel takes on a difficult question: who has authority over the “truth” of 
ending one’s life? The medical, juridical, or religious institutions, or the suffering person 
herself? By way of providing an answer to this question, the novel consistently presents 
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assisted dying in terms of its potential to aid suffering persons, thus conceptualizing it as 
something necessary, ultimately positive, and belonging to the province of the sufferer, 
rather than the institution. 
 In the following chapter, I will apply the same process of analysis I have used in 
my consideration of Jürg Reinhart to Lukas Bärfuss’ play Alices Reise in die Schweiz. I 
will, much as in the preceding pages, examine the role of normalizing institutional 
discourse on the characters, and their subsequent reactions to this influence, in order to 
examine more closely possible acts of resistance, and the resulting performances of 
agency within this discursive framework by the characters. Following this, I will 
synthesize my findings, as I aim to reach further conclusions about the portrayal of 
assisted dying in my chosen texts. 
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Chapter 4.2: Alices Reise in die Schweiz 
 
Introduction 
Lukas Bärfuss’ play Alices Reise in die Schweiz (2007) relates a series of events 
in the life of the physician Dr. Gustav Strom, as he seeks to perform what he sees as the 
noble and necessary work of the Sterbehelfer in helping those who wish to die do so. The 
play weaves together several storylines around Strom, focusing on two of Strom’s 
patients, Alice and John, Alice’s mother Lotte, his assistant Eva, and his landlord Walter, 
constructing a narrative that neither expounds nor derides the practice of assisted suicide, 
but rather offers a perspective on the moral and emotional complexities inherent in 
processes of illness and death. Accordingly, the work explores not only personal 
experiences of the characters with assisted dying, but also the institutional, legal and 
discursive frameworks within which the practice of assisted dying must operate. 
As assisted dying is a topic that emphasizes the importance of individual agency, 
this chapter seeks to explore how the play approaches the idea of autonomous decision-
making. Accordingly, in the following pages I will examine the regulatory frameworks 
that govern assisted dying in Alices Reise in die Schweiz by analyzing how agency and 
institutional power are constructed in the texts, with particular attention paid to how these 
frameworks interact with the characters. I argue that, in Alices Reise in die Schweiz, 
assisted dying exists in a regulatory framework that intersects with manifestations of 
biopower, and foregrounds the potential for personal agency in the context of the 
institutional powers at play. I will show how discourses of institutional power are 
reflected in the text, and then investigate the kinds of agency characters can have within 
existing regulatory frameworks.  
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The Institution – Medicine 
In Alices Reise in die Schweiz, there are several dominant discourses at work, 
chiefly those of the medical, the juridical, and the public forum, as well as underlying 
humanist discourses of personal choice. These discourses, taken together, form a major 
part of the context in which all discussions around assisted dying take place, the events in 
Alices Reise in die Schweiz being of course no exception.  
In Bärfuss’ play, this institutional framework is particularly evident in the actions 
and events surrounding the physician and Sterbehelfer Dr. Gustav Strom. Although the 
Swiss juridical discourses around assisted suicide are portrayed as being ultimately 
dominant, as evidenced by the legality of the procedure, resistance to this state-
sanctioned legal framework occurs throughout the text, as different institutional bodies 
attempt to enforce alternate regulatory norms by disciplining characters for their actions. 
Strom becomes the target of such disciplinary actions several times throughout 
the play, as his legally protected desire to aid in the suicide of ill persons conflicts with 
the medical association. Partway through the play, Dr. Strom is contacted by the medical 
board in a letter, which is then read to him by his assistant Eva:  
“Ihre Ansichten” schreibt die Ärztekammer, “sind mit den Standesregeln nicht 
vereinbar. Der durchaus notwendigen Diskussion um Sterbehilfe bei 
Gemütskranken, wird mit diesen extremen Ansichten bloß geschadet. Eine 
Arztpraxis darf kein Ort des Todes werden. Sie muss, im Gegenteil, ein Hort der 
Hoffnung und des Lebens bleiben. Der Vorstand, mit Datum dieses Schreibens, 
hat deshalb beschlossen, sein Mitglied Gustav Strom, gemäß den Statuten 
auszuschließen und ihm die Zulassung zu entziehen.” (Bärfuss 32)  
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Thus, in light of Strom’s legally sanctioned activities as a Sterbehelfer, in this case, 
helping the mentally ill to die, the medical board has elected to strip him of his 
certification as a physician; this disciplining act attempts to establish a norm around 
assisted dying that differs starkly from pre-existing juridical precepts. By punishing 
Strom for his actions, in effect, for not conforming to the proper notion of a physician as 
set out by the medical board, the medical discourse attempts to govern assisted dying by 
restricting who may assist in another’s death, despite this already being determined by the 
law; any Swiss citizen may aid another person in their suicide, independent of profession. 
Interestingly, the conflict here arises not merely out of the question of who may assist 
another in dying, but whose death may be assisted; quite simply, is one allowed to assist 
in the death of those with mental illnesses, as opposed to physical ones? 
What is occurring here is a conflict over the “correct” interpretation of what it 
means to be a physician; in other words, a contest of who can claim the power of the 
“truth,” in a Foucauldian sense, of the function of medicine. As Strom explains at the 
beginning of the play, he has a different interpretation of the Hippocratic oath than most 
would expect: “die Frage kommt immer: Sie haben doch den Hippokratischen Eid 
geleistet. Ja, habe ich. Wie können Sie also Menschen in den Tod begleiten. Gerade weil 
ich ihn geleistet habe. Gesundheit ist verhandelbar, die Würde des menschlichen Lebens 
nicht” (12).  
Strom’s interpretation of the Hippocratic oath, while being consistent with his 
legal right to aid in others’ suicides, compels him to do so in direct opposition to the role 
of the physician according to the medical board. Additionally, Strom’s humanistic 
interpretation of the oath is a contestation of different “truths” about the control of or 
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over life. Strom values the individual’s right to control their own lives, regardless of their 
state of health, in direct opposition to the existing controls of the medical institution, 
which seek to restrict the individual’s right of control over their own life by deeming 
certain people with certain (mental) illnesses as being unfit to have this control. 
Concerning mental illness, an established hierarchy of illness can be seen 
throughout the play; specifically, a “truth” about the nature of illness that, in relation to 
assisted dying, privileges the physically ill over the mentally ill. As Strom was disbarred 
specifically in response to his helping those with mental illness die, but not in reference 
to those with physical illnesses, these disciplining actions seek to regulate not only Strom, 
but also the position of mental illness relative to assisted dying. In doing so, medical 
discourse positions patients with mental illnesses as having less authority to decide 
whether or not to commit suicide than those with physical, easily verifiable terminal 
illnesses. As Strom explains; 
“Wenn [du] an einer Krankheit im terminalen Stadium leidest und deine Leiden 
keine Aussicht auf Besserung last […] dann wirst du noch heute zehn 
Organisationen finden […] die eine Spritze in deinen dürren Arm setzen, dir den 
erlösenden Tod schenken […] und andernfalls. Wenn du […] zur festen 
Überzeugung gekommen bist, dass deine Existenz keinen Sinn hat […] wenn du 
alle paar Monate ein paar Monate auf der Abteilung G verbringst […] vollgestopft 
mit Leponex, aufgeschwemmt von Thorazin.1 […] Wer wird dir dann helfen. Nur 
einer, ich, Gustav Strom.” (37-39) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Leponex and Thorazin are trade names for clozapine and chlorpromazine, two antipsychotic medications. 
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Accordingly, in providing mentally ill persons with assistance in their suicides, Strom’s 
conduct is in direct opposition to the precepts established by the medical discourses 
around mental and physical illness in respect to assisted dying, and as such he finds 
himself the subject of the aforementioned disciplining actions. 
Naturally, the influence of the medical community does not end with the 
regulation of the conduct of the physician, rather also extending to the physician’s 
patients. Towards the beginning of the play, after Alice has contacted him with her 
request for help in ending her life, Strom travels to Germany to visit Alice’s mother, 
Lotte, to explain to her what her daughter intends to do and, on Alice’s behalf, to ask for 
her blessing to proceed. Lotte remains unconvinced, however, that her daughter will end 
her life with the help of Dr. Strom, maintaining that she has tried before to end her life 
and that it is simply “ein Spiel. Es gibt sogar ein Wort dafür. Appellativer Suizid. Haben 
mir die Ärzte gesagt” (29).  
This evidences an act of discipline on Alice as a patient by the medical institution. 
The doctors referenced by Lotte have, upon interacting with the historically suicidal 
Alice, diagnosed her as attempting parasuicide, which, in contrast to suicide attempts in 
earnest, is defined as “suicide attempts and deliberate self-harm inflicted with no intent to 
die” (Welch 368). Thus, according to her German physicians, Alice’s previous attempts 
on her own life were merely out of a desire for attention, rather than from rational desire 
to end her suffering at the hands of her illness, and by extension, these self-same medical 
professionals. Rather than being taken seriously in her desire to end her life, she is 
diagnosed as simply attention-seeking, through which it is implied that she is mentally ill, 
because she is seen as having acted irrationally in wishing to end her life; apparently, as 
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seen by the medical institution, only a mentally ill person would seek to end her own life. 
This has the effect of stripping Alice of her rationality and, in so doing, undermining the 
institution of assisted dying; if assisted dying services can only be accessed by those 
sound of mind, and those who wish to end their lives are rendered fundamentally 
unsound of mind through that desire, no one can legally access the service.  
However, Alice’s choice to seek assistance in ending her life can be seen as a 
resistive act against this definition of the suicide-seeker as mentally ill or attention 
seeking, as her desire to end her life is validated by the doctor to whom she goes for help. 
In taking her seriously, Strom both flaunts Alice’s previous diagnosis, resisting the 
authority of the medical institution over the "truth" of their categorization of the suicidal 
as ill, and re-categorizes her as a rational person, which re-legitimizes her claim to 
accessing assisted dying services; this in turn has the effect of re-legitimizing the service 
itself. In effect, what Alice’s actions accomplish is a subversion of the established, 
medicalized truth of the mindset of the suicidal person, and the categorization of wilful 
assisted suicide as the province of the sane, rather than the (mentally) ill.  
Once again, this represents a contestation of discourses about the “truth” of who 
may maintain control of their body, life, and death; on one hand there are the humanistic 
discourses of the autonomous self, and on the other the regulatory system of biopower, 
represented by the medical institution. This struggle comes up again in a conversation 
between Alice and Eva prior to Alice’s death, as Strom wishes Eva to check “ob [Alice 
ihren] Entschluss bei klarem Verstand getroffen [hat]” (43). Their conversation 
emphasizes topics that are by no means strictly governed by logic, seemingly in order to 
deduce Alice’s frame of mind from her responses. This functions as a method of 
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diagnosis, and accordingly, is an expression of the regulatory system of biopower by the 
medical institution; depending on Alice’s responses, she will be designated as either 
having made her decision to die of sound mind, or irrationally. The implication of this is 
that, while, in Switzerland, obtaining help with one’s suicide is not dependent on one’s 
mental health, Alice will be handled differently by Strom depending on her mental status. 
In other words, it is her mental status, as it is diagnosed by the medical institution, that 
regulates her access to help with her suicide, in direct opposition to the humanistic 
discourses of autonomy that support the individual’s freedom to make the decision to 
commit suicide, and for others to choose to assist that individual. 
The relationship between Alice and Strom is not merely limited to the 
legitimization of Alice’s desire for release from her worldly suffering, rather it is also a 
site of resistance against the categorizations of “patient” and “physician” imposed by the 
medical institution. Later in the play, as Alice’s preparations to end her life advance, 
Strom pays her a visit after being released from temporary detention 
("Untersuchungshaft"). He asks her again if she is sure she wants his help, and after 
answering in the affirmative, apparently struck by Strom’s seriousness, Alice suggests he 
take a holiday. Strom then in turn suggests that she come with him. In the next scene, Eva, 
Strom’s assistant, confronts him about his plans and questions his motivations; she 
eventually insists to him, “du wirst dich auf das Fachliche beschränken. Sie ist deine 
Patientin. Denk daran” (Bärfuss 42). Then, despite Eva’s warning, the next scene takes 
place at the ocean, where the pair express a certain closeness, even intimacy, in their 
conversation. However, Gustav rebuffs Alice’s invitation for closer contact: 
Gustav – Ich fürchte nur, wir könnten zu weit gehen. 
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Alice – Wie weit ist zu weit. 
Gustav – Wir sollten uns auf das Fachliche beschränken. 
Alice – Was ist das Fachliche. 
Gustav – Ich bin dein Arzt. Du bist meine Patientin. Du willst sterben.  
   Ich helfe dir dabei. (43) 
 These interactions between physician and patient serve firstly as resistive acts 
against the medical institution’s categorization of the roles of the physician and the 
patient, but also represent a re-submission of a kind to this normalizing influence, despite 
the decidedly subversive thrust of their interactions in context – that is, the context of 
assisted dying. By resisting the demands inherent in adhering to “das Fachliche” (42), 
Strom and Alice subvert the idea that the relationship between physician and patient 
ought to be de-humanized and framed only in respect to the patient’s illness and its cure. 
Thus, in engaging in behaviours designated as inappropriate between doctors and patients, 
such as taking a holiday together, Strom and Alice subvert the medical institution’s 
authority over what it means to be a physician or a patient. 
This rejection of the medical institution’s norm is however not done in favour of 
another standard endorsed by the discourses around assisted dying, because, as evidenced 
by Eva’s warning to Strom, the patient-physician relationship norms related by the 
discourses around assisted dying are apparently much the same as those constructed by 
the medical institution on the whole. It seems that Strom and Eva attempt to engage with 
a hitherto unknown or unexplored norm of patient-doctor interaction, neither endorsed by 
the discourses around assisted dying, nor those of the greater medical institution. Rather, 
what this situation indicates is actually a struggle between the humanist discourses of 
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autonomy, and the bio-political discourses that give over personal autonomy to the state 
and institution. Through this perspective, Alice and Strom can be seen to subscribe to 
discourses of personal autonomy, performing a resistive function against the bio-political 
discourse attempting to govern patient-doctor interactions, those of the medical 
institution, which classify behaviour such as Strom’s and Alice’s as being inappropriate 
for their roles. In any case, this attempt at resisting the bio-political discourses of doctor-
patient interaction appears to be ultimately unsuccessful, as Strom heeds the warnings of 
his assistant, ceasing his activities with Alice by retreating to the established norms of 
said interaction; that is, he is the physician, and his role is to help his patient. 
Despite this, Strom’s model of patient-doctor interaction remains anchored in the 
context of assisted dying; Strom holds fast to his belief that the role of the physician 
includes helping patients who wish to end their lives. Although he returns to the 
established norm of physician as service provider and patient as the receiver of those 
services, Strom pointedly states that assisted suicide is one of these services; “du [Alice] 
willst sterben. Ich helfe dir dabei” (43). In doing this, Strom may fall back into an 
established model of doctor-patient interaction, but his actions within this model remain 
subversive to the norms established by the medical institution surrounding the role of the 
physician. 
The Institution – Public Discourse 
In the play, the public reaction to assisted dying forms a kind of resistance against 
the established juridical precepts that structure and regulate assisted dying services in 
Switzerland; despite the legality and overall positive public attitude towards the 
availability of the service, the public perception of the process and those who are 
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involved in it is not. Towards the beginning of the play, this is first made clear to us 
through Dr. Strom’s explanation of his motivations and activities. In explaining his 
intentions and the difficulties he has faced in helping others to die, he brings up the 
negative influence the media has had on the maintenance of his practice: “Seit sich die 
Medien für mich interessieren, bin ich mit meiner Praxis in Schwierigkeiten geraten. Von 
einem Doktor Tod, wie sie mich nennen, lässt man sich nicht behandeln” (13). 
Through the media, the public discourses around assisted dying serve to discipline 
Strom for his actions as a Sterbehelfer, reacting to the media dubbing him “Doctor Death,” 
designating him then as not to be trusted with life, and in so doing curtailing his medical 
practice. Although his actions are legally supported, and in being made legal, had been 
previously endorsed by the public, the public’s expressed discomfort with Strom’s 
actions results in difficulties for him in maintaining his practice. Simply put, as a result of 
Strom breaking with the norms associated with his position as a physician by offering his 
patients help with their suicides, he is disciplined by the public who had previously 
sought to support the right to that very help. 
Another source of resistance to Strom’s actions as Sterbehelfer by the public 
sphere comes in the form of his landlord, Walter. At several points throughout the play, 
Walter speaks with Strom, each time communicating public perception of Strom and his 
work, cloaked in Walter’s concern for his business interests; for example, the first of 
these conversations focuses on Strom’s old neighbour Frau Gubser and her poor opinion 
of his work. On a superficial level, these conversations appear to be merely business-
oriented; Walter wishes to rent his apartments, and he fears that talk about Strom’s 
activities and methods may be hindering that in some way. As he tells Strom, “die 
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Wohnung [der alten Nachbarin] habe ich ausgeschrieben. Vor einer Woche schon. Noch 
hat keiner sich gemeldet” (21). Walter communicates the beliefs of the broader public 
who, despite supporting the right to access assistance in committing suicide, express  
discomfort with it actually occurring. Public discomfort manifests itself in actions that, in 
effect, discipline those who are involved with the process in some way, as their actions 
do not conform to the public’s expectations of assisted dying. In leaving Walter’s 
apartments unrented and disparaging Strom’s reputation, public discourse subverts the 
juridical – although their actions lie within legal boundaries, they are nonetheless subject 
to the regulating effects of the public forum.  
Additionally, not only do the public’s expressions of discomfort suggest a 
subversion of the juridical, but there is also a certain fascination with Strom’s work 
inherent in these expressions. By paying so close attention to a subject the public 
associates with discomfort and uncleanliness, and by sensationalizing Strom as a “Doktor 
Tod” (13), the media displays a fascination with something it has helped to construct as 
obscene. This fascination plays itself out in Walter’s second conversation with Strom, as 
he first decries Strom’s methods as “doch nicht zivilisiert” (34), but then displays a 
voyeuristic desire to be present at a patient’s death: 
Walter – Ich dachte eben, dass Sie die Leute einschläfern […]  
   Jedenfalls nicht ersticken. 
Gustav – Die Patienten spüren nichts. 
Walter – Wie können Sie das wissen. 
Gustav – Sie müssen es gesehen haben. 
Walter – Ja, glauben Sie, das wäre möglich, Herr Doktor. 
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Gustav – Sie möchten dabei sein. 
Walter – Immerhin bin ich der Vermieter. (35) 
This voyeuristic interest in something the public has categorized as uncomfortable and 
uncivilized shows yet another level in the process of regulation and normalization found 
in the play. There is not merely a subversion of the juridical here, rather also a fascination 
with what is forbidden; the regulating and normalizing process is clearly not simply about 
ethics or being civilized, but also access and control over the forbidden. 
This discomfort with assisted suicide is of course not limited to the realm of the 
general public or the uninitiated. Despite her initial enthusiasm to help Dr. Strom with his 
work, and her assertion that “die Gesellschaft versteht [ihn] nicht” (19), even Eva 
eventually expresses discomfort with the process after being made the target of regulating 
discipline by the public sphere. After beginning to work for Strom, she returns home one 
day and, just for the fun of it, invites a neighbour to come by for supper. She had, earlier 
in the day, helped an elderly woman with liver cancer to die, and it came to pass that a 
long, white hair from the woman ended up in the goulash Eva cooked for the evening.  
Ups. Sagt [die Nachbarin]. Wo kommt das denn her. Das muss Frau Gürbaczs 
Haar sein […] Sie hatte Leberkrebs. […] Ich habe ihr beim Sterben geholfen. Die 
Nachbarin springt aus dem Stuhl. Aufs Klo, dachte ich. Nein. Zu sich in die 
Wohnung. Habe gehört wie oben die Tur ging, und kurz darauf im Klo die 
Spülung. (27) 
Although the hair was neither “ein Leichenhaar” (27), nor from someone with a 
communicable illness, the neighbour woman saw it as nothing other than dirty, associated 
with something dead and therefore unclean; indeed, her reactions portray not only the 
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evidence of Eva’s activities, but also the actions themselves as such. By leaving dinner so 
abruptly and cutting off her contact with Eva, the neighbour manifests the public’s 
discomfort with assisted suicide and disciplines Eva for her actions as Sterbehelferin/-
assistentin; simply, she categorizes Eva’s conduct as unclean, as unacceptable, despite 
the juridical discourses around assisted dying. 
This regulatory act has the secondary effect of embedding itself in Eva’s thoughts 
about assisted dying, as she eventually finds that she cannot handle the stress of helping 
Strom any longer. Having helped Lotte, Alice’s mother, to echoe her daughter’s choice to 
end her life, Eva tells Strom, “Gustav. Ich habe es dir noch nicht gesagt. Mir hängt dieses 
Land zum Hals raus. Es ist alles so schmutzig hier, inwendig schmutzig” (55). Although 
Strom and Eva’s actions have never deviated from the established discursive norms 
around assisted dying, the social pressure to categorize the process as unclean and 
uncomfortable ultimately affects a change in how Eva views her past work with Strom. 
Her reaction to the stress of aiding Strom in his work shows how Eva has become aware 
of the double standard around assisted dying in the public discourse; that is, the process’ 
categorization by the public as something unclean, while simultaneously being condoned 
by the juridical discourse. As a result of this, Eva finds herself unable to reconcile these 
competing categorizations, ultimately resulting in her disengagement from her work with 
the doctor. This is reflected in Eva’s attitude towards Strom’s work throughout the play; 
originally convinced of the importance of his work, her actions affirmed the juridical 
discourses around assisted suicide. But, having become exposed to society’s unjustified 
categorization of assisted dying as being somehow unclean, and the general public 
discomfort with death, as evidenced in the play by Strom’s ex-wife’s disgust with his 
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touching the dead (42) and Walter’s categorization of Strom’s less-aesthetically pleasing 
method with the plastic bag as uncivilized (34), Eva dissociates herself from the 
Sterbehelfer, his work, and the discourses around them.  
The Institution – Juridical Discourse 
 As seen in the previous pages, those who are involved with assisted suicide 
services are subject to the scrutiny and regulating effects of multiple discourses. 
Unsurprisingly, the discourses of perhaps the highest importance for the institution are 
those of the juridical, as, owing to its legalization and continued legitimization through 
these discourses, the legal sphere maintains authority over the truths, in a Foucauldian 
sense, of assisted dying. It follows then, that the practitioners of assisted suicide, that is to 
say those who assist in suicide, turn to the juridical discourse to legitimize their actions in 
the face of attempts by alternative discourses to regulate the practice in some way. 
 However, owing to this legitimizing, regulatory influence, juridical discourses are 
also involved in the disciplining of those Sterbehelfer who deviate from the legally 
established roles pursuant to the practice. As Strom notes towards the beginning of the 
play, “Der Staat versucht, mich einzuschüchtern. Ich habe den ganzen letzten Frühling in 
Untersuchungshaft verbracht. […] Sie wollten mich gefügig machen. Es wird ihnen nicht 
gelingen” (12). Although Strom owes the legality of his activities to the Swiss criminal 
code, he is nonetheless disciplined through juridical discourses surrounding it as his 
motivations for aiding the ill in ending their lives are continually questioned and 
categorized. 
 Midway through the play, Strom tells of his second stint behind bars. As he waits 
to have his motivations questioned, he is psychiatrically evaluated and, as he retells, “ein 
   
	   73	  
Psychiater […] befragte mich. Er meinte, ich sei krank […] ich sei fixiert. Ich sähe nur 
den Tod” (37). Afterwards, in questioning, his investigators ask him: “Warum, Herr 
Strom, leisten Sie Depressiven Sterbehilfe. Was sind Ihre Gründe” (37). He answers this 
question with a wrenching monologue, constructing a bleak picture of debilitating illness, 
seemingly endless suffering, and physical and mental deterioration, finally declaring, 
“wenn die Spülung am Klo singt, ichwillnichtmehr, ichwillnichtmehr, ichwillnichtmehr, 
und das Parkett unter deinen Füßen die Worte Machsdoch, Machsdoch knirschen. Wer 
wird dir dann helfen. Nur einer, ich, Gustav Strom” (39). 
 This questioning of both Strom’s mental health as well as his reasons for wishing 
to busy himself with such grim tasks as aiding in death after death is perhaps warranted; 
certainly, part and parcel of the continuing legality of the procedure of assisted suicide is 
of course the assurance that the rules around it are followed accordingly. Regardless of its 
necessity, these instances of questioning, and particularly the physical imprisonment 
suffered by Strom during it, are pure instruments of regulation and discipline by the legal 
apparatus of the state.  They serve as a constant reminder that the juridical discourse is the 
main claimant to the truths surrounding assisted suicide, and that those who step outside 
of the established norms for the practice will be disciplined accordingly. For his part, 
Strom is never convicted of breaking with established juridical norms, however his 
behaviour as a Sterbehelfer is, in part through his time in jail awaiting questioning, 
continually regulated by the judiciary. 
 This regulation, while evident throughout the play in the manner with which 
Strom generally conducts himself with his patients, is never more clearly displayed than 
during Alice’s death scene. Throughout the scene, Strom handles Alice gently, guiding 
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her through the process of her death, answering questions, helping her stay calm, but all 
the while ensuring she partakes of each step of the process on her own initiative. 
Eventually, as she has taken the fatal medication and lain herself down, she continues to 
talk with Strom: 
 Alice – Ich muss die Plastiktüte. Wo ist die Plastiktüte. 
 Gustav – Hier. Sie liegt neben dir […] 
 Alice – Mach du das doch für mich […] 
 Gustav – Das kann ich nicht. 
 Alice – Hilf mir doch. 
 Gustav – Ich darf nicht, Alice, das Gesetz […] 
              Das Strafgesetz. Das habe ich dir doch erklärt. (51) 
Despite the closeness between the physician and his patient implied in the play, Strom 
stays by Alice’s side as she takes her own life, but does not touch her or aid her in any 
way beyond speaking with her; as he states, the law regulates his conduct in this situation. 
It is clear to see that he dare not attempt to subvert the established norms, for if he were 
to do so, he could not continue his work; in Alices Reise in die Schweiz, the juridical 
discourse is and remains the main regulatory influence around assisted dying practices. 
Agency – The Patient 
To begin the second part of my analysis of Alices Reise in die Schweiz, I turn now 
to the expression of agency in the play. Much as in my examination of agency in Jürg 
Reinhart, this part of the analysis will approach agency by employing the Butlerian 
concept of performativity in order to conceptualize agency as an iterative performance 
within regulatory frameworks. Through these performative acts, the characters display a 
   
	   75	  
certain degree of agency, rooting the discourse around assisted dying firmly in rhetoric of 
self-determination, despite, and yet in respect to, regulating discourses. This performance 
of agency is a key element throughout the play, as different characters engage with Dr. 
Strom’s work in various capacities, as patients, colleagues, or otherwise. The significance 
of the decisions made by the characters, and level of agency displayed by these decisions, 
varies. However, particular characters perform their agency in particularly meaningful 
ways, and it is on these characters that I will focus my analysis. 
Beginning with the titular Alice, she, as a result of her incurable illness,2 seeks the 
help of Dr. Strom in ending her life. This is an act of resistance against the medical 
discourse, as she, a supposedly terminally ill person, would be expected to enter palliative 
or end-of-life care. Instead of doing so, Alice chooses to end her life on her own terms, in 
direct opposition to the manner of dying prescribed to the terminally ill by the medical 
institution. Additionally, in traveling to Switzerland to seek this assistance, Alice 
pointedly challenges the legal framework around the notion of suicide or assisted dying 
in her home country, Germany. Alice’s resistance against the dominant medical discourse, 
and the German legal framework around the issue, that claims authority over the “right 
way to die” can be seen as a performance of agency. 
In Alice’s performance of agency, there lies, however, an interesting complication 
in the diagnoses the young woman has received throughout, and prior to, the play. Early 
in the play, Alice indicates that she has an illness from which she will certainly die; this 
illness is diagnosed prior to the beginning of the play. This diagnosis is then passively re-
confirmed by Dr. Strom in his taking on Alice as a patient; in doing this, he recognizes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Interestingly, Alice’s illness is not explicitly defined in the play. As Bärfuss states in an email addressed 
to me, dated July 17, 2015; “nein, auch ich kenne Alices Krankheit nicht. Sie hat es mir nie gesagt.” 
   
	   76	  
her illness as being legitimate and requiring treatment. However, Alice’s diagnosis is then 
challenged by Lotte, who ascribes Alice’s illness to a lack of activity and the other 
physicians’ categorization of Alice’s wish for death as merely attention-seeking.  
This series of diagnoses and counter-diagnoses, given to Alice as truths about 
herself, are in a manner of speaking the guide for her resistive actions. I contend, 
accordingly, that Alice’s agency is performed in response to her original diagnosis, as she 
seeks assistance in ending her life, rather than entering other treatment, but not in 
response to the diagnoses that follow it throughout the play; regardless of the content of 
the subsequent diagnoses, Alice remains focused on her desire to end her life, perhaps 
inspired as it was by her original diagnosis. 
Towards the end of the play, however, the situation becomes more complex. After 
being interviewed by Eva to check her clear mental state and understanding of her 
decision, Alice arrives at Dr. Strom’s clinic, only to seem hesitant, displaying a lack of 
focus on the task at hand as she speaks with Strom about various, seemingly unrelated 
subjects. Strom must guide her through the process she had been previously committed to, 
as she is confused and forgetful, needing him to remind her of her wishes and the process 
at hand; this is an abrupt departure from the brusque attitude displayed during her 
interview with Eva. Having once made the autonomous decision to end her life, guided at 
least in part by her diagnoses, she now allows herself to be guided not only by the 
discourse around assisted dying, but by Dr. Strom directly, doing what is expected of her 
as a person seeking assistance with their suicide: 
Alice – Jetzt bin ich ruhig. Also. Reichst du es mir. 
Gustav – Bitte. 
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Alice – Das Glas. Ich bin so müde. 
Gustav – Augenblick. Möchtest du lieber sitzen oder liegen. 
Alice – Liegen. Ich kann nicht liegend trinken. 
Gustav – Klar. Trinken bestimmt im Sitzen, bloß der Plastiksack. 
Alice – Plastiksack. 
Gustav – Alice. Es geht darum, du musst dir, also. Zuerst trinkst du das 
        aufgelöste Rohypnol, und dann musst du, diesen Plastiksack, hier, 
      so, von oben über den Kopf ziehen. Wie eine Kapuze. Und die Frage 
      ist, möchtest du dazu lieber sitzen oder liegen. 
Alice – Das weiß ich jetzt nicht […] Was ist besser […] Sag du. (50) 
Alice continues to resist the dominant broader medical discourse, but her behaviour 
indicates she may no longer do so actively; rather, she simply succumbs to the influence 
of the specific discourses around assisted dying and Strom’s adherence to those 
discourses. 
Much as Alice’s agency shifts during the play, so too does that of John, a patient 
of Dr. Strom’s who has traveled from England to end his life. He has, much as Alice, 
chosen to end his life in a manner in opposition to the dominant medical discourse and 
challenges the legal framework of his home country in doing so. However, unlike her, 
John makes an appointment for his death three times, delaying it twice. The first time, he 
decides that he does not wish to die drunk, after having a last drink of whiskey:  
I don’t want to cause you trouble, doctor. Maybe we should stop this […] Okay. 
It’s now or never. Doctor. This is the moment. Thanks for the whiskey anyway. 
Good bye. […] I am drunk. […] I don’t want to die drunk […] I am going home.  
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That’s the best thing for it. […] I am not a coward. I am English. I will come back, 
Doctor, I promise. I can’t wait to die. (24-26) 
During his second visit, he decides he’d like to record the conversations leading up to his 
death, so that Dr. Strom can write a book about the stories he tells;  
You should tape this story. It’s a good story. Maybe you can sell it later […] I was 
just thinking. About all these funny stories I know. I could dictate them to you 
[…] And after my death you can publish them […] I will come back. With the 
tape recorder. (30-31) 
John is described as being elderly and very ill, and conducts these trips between England 
and Switzerland at significant risk; each of these trips is, however, constitutive of an act 
of agency in the face of the discourses around assisted dying. In engaging with the 
process of assisted dying, he already resists the dominant medical discourse, but in twice 
refusing to carry out his suicide, he also performs resistance against the discourses around 
assisted suicide by not acting as he is expected to. John performs agency by acting as he 
wishes, apparently without regard for the expectations set for him; despite being expected 
to enter end-of-life care, or alternately to end his life to alleviate his suffering, he does 
neither.  
The last patient-character whose performance of agency I wish to consider is that 
of Lotte, Alice’s mother. For much of the play, Lotte is portrayed as being staunchly 
against her daughter’s plans to end her own life. Indeed, she appears to show little 
understanding of her daughter’s motivations or the nature of her illness: 
Lotte – Kind. Du wirst tot sein […] Warum willst du. Dich. Dir das Leben        
             nehmen. 
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Alice – Ich bin es müde. 
Lotte – Du. Müde. Wovon. Du tust ja nichts […] 
Alice – Ich darf nichts tun. Ich bin krank.  
Lotte – Du bist krank, weil du nichts tust. (15-16) 
As seen here, Lotte’s understanding of Alice’s illness hinges on a notion of illness that 
denotes activity as healthy and a lack of it as causing illness. In telling her daughter this, 
Lotte offers a competing diagnosis to Strom’s, in an attempt to sway her daughter’s 
decision.  
So uncomprehending of her daughter’s desire is Lotte that she even refuses to 
accompany Alice to Switzerland, should she go through with her plans: 
 Alice – Kommst du mit. 
 Lotte – Du musst alleine gehen. 
 Alice – Was bist du feige […] Das bist du mir schuldig. 
 Lotte – Ich schulde dir nichts, Mädchen. (18) 
Lotte’s understanding of her daughter’s wishes remains unchanged throughout the 
majority of the play; however, just as Alice moves to leave on her trip to Switzerland, she 
asks her mother for her blessing – which Lotte does not explicitly grant: 
 Alice – Gibst du mir deinen Segen. 
 Lotte – Meinen Segen. 
 Alice – Bitte. Mama. 
 Lotte – Jetzt geh schon, Kind, geh schon. (46-47) 
Lotte’s actions betray how truly enmeshed she is in the social norms to which she 
subscribes; her daughter’s behaviour, indeed even the institution of assisted dying more 
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generally, does not fit with her worldview, being more aligned as it is with the public 
discourse around assisted suicide discussed in the former part of this chapter. Her actions 
towards her daughter seem to follow a social script; as she states towards the beginning 
of the play during a conversation with her daughter about her plans to commit suicide, 
“was werden die Leute denken?” (17). However, some time after her daughter has died, 
Lotte experiences what seems to be a radical change in her understanding of why one 
would wish to end one’s life. Indeed, finding herself with nothing left, she contacts Dr. 
Strom: 
Eva, mach das Zimmer bereit, eine Frau braucht unsere Hilfe. Ihre Gründe. Keine 
Aufgabe mehr. Keiner da, der sie noch brauchen würde. Ein gutes Leben gehabt, 
aber ihre Existenz habe sich nun erübrigt […] Eva. Du könntest Lotte begleiten. 
Sie hat gute Gründe, wir wollen ihr helfen. (52-53) 
Lotte’s choice to end her life represents a paradigm shift in her understanding of assisted 
suicide services, and a break away from the social norms she was previously so tightly 
enmeshed in. 
 However, while Lotte’s choice to end her life with the help of Eva and Dr. Strom 
appears to be a performance of agency much like John’s or her daughter’s, in that she 
actively moves from the social norms that had previously guided her to another, namely 
those around assisted dying, there is more to the situation. Lotte’s subscription to either 
of these sets of norms is in each case reliant on others; in the case of the former, “die 
Leute,” and the latter, her daughter. Without her daughter’s subversive actions, Lotte 
would not have become depressed, nor sought help with her suicide; effectively, the 
subversive potential of Lotte’s actions was enabled only through her daughter. Although 
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Lotte moves between discursive norms much as John or Alice, she does not do so 
independently, and as such seems to lack a performance of a certain agency in her actions. 
Both John and Alice, through their acts of resistance against dominant discourses, 
perform a kind of agency, despite this agency remaining enmeshed in options for 
compliance and resistance that are inherent in the discursive model. Although the 
characters cannot be said to have a truly independent agency, they willingly perform 
particular actions, resisting and moving between discursive norms. Lotte, on the other 
hand, in how her actions pertaining to her own and her daughter’s deaths, seems to lack a 
certain agency in her performance; despite undoubtedly moving between discursive 
norms over the course of the play, she appears to negotiate her place within these norms 
primarily in reference to others, rather than on the basis of her own, independent, desires. 
Agency – The Physician 
 Having discussed the character of the patient in respect to the performance of 
agency, I move now to the character of the physician – namely, Dr. Gustav Strom and his 
assistant, Eva. Beginning with the latter of the two Sterbehelfer, Eva performs a certain 
kind of agency in her actions throughout the play, but chiefly in relation to three events: 
the start of her work with Dr. Strom, her reaction to him being stripped of his medical 
certification, and her eventual departure at the end of the play. 
 Owing to her education, “sechs Semester Medizin” (20), one would likely not be 
remiss in assuming that Eva’s perspective would be, at least in some ways, congruent 
with that of the medical institution; however, this is where the first of her expressions of 
agency lies. Despite her education in, and perhaps indoctrination into, the ways of 
thinking associated with the medical institution, Eva’s desire to aid Dr. Strom in his work 
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as a Sterbehelfer is a clear abandonment of the norms put forth by the medical institution 
in favour of those surrounding assisted dying. 
 As Strom is later disciplined by the medical board, functioning as a representative 
of the medical institution, he initially despairs; for, without the ability to write 
prescriptions for his patients, how can he acquire the barbiturates with which to aid in 
their passing? Eva, however, seems to remain unaffected by this disciplining act; she 
compares this censorship to how “die Gesellschaft, vor hundert Jahren, hat die 
Abtreibung als ein Werk des Teufels erklärt” (32), and declares that even without the 
medication they need for their work, they “[werden] eine andere Methode finden […] die 
eine direkte ärztliche Mitwirkung [erübrigt]” (33). In this, Eva declares her commitment 
to the subversive understandings that categorize the discourse around assisted dying by 
re-categorizing the medical institution, through the comparison of Strom’s de-licensing 
and the banning of abortion, as not having the best interests of the public at heart. Here, 
Eva displays a radically historical understanding of discourse; although Strom sees his 
actions as universal and humanitarian, Eva sees their work as resisting out-dated 
knowledge that has not yet been replaced. Additionally, in stating her intention to help 
Strom find a method to help his patients that needs no “ärztliche Mitwirkung” (33), she 
repeats her intention to move away from the norms of the medical institution, this time by 
finding a workaround that does not involve doctor-specific methods. 
 Eva’s performance of agency is further exposed, interestingly, in her 
abandonment of the precepts she so staunchly defends in the face of discipline by the 
medical board. After aiding Lotte in her suicide, Eva finds herself unable to handle aiding 
Strom in his work any longer, as she can no longer reconcile society’s categorization of 
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the practice of assisted suicide as unclean with its simultaneous, somewhat hypocritical, 
condoning of the process, as seen through its legality. In her final appearance in the play, 
Eva performs an act of agency in that despite her previous commitment to Strom, she 
returns to the established societal norms she had distanced herself from through her work 
with the doctor. This is, however, in reaction to the societal pressures and media attention 
inherent in being involved with Strom’s work. Eva has realized that although the public 
discourse positions Switzerland as open to the availability of assisted dying services, 
disciplinary public and medical discourses in Switzerland force her into an abject 
subjecthood; Eva and Strom both find themselves excluded from a society that does not 
condone their behaviour, while posing as though it did. Realizing this, Eva chooses to 
leave for Romania, moving away from both Switzerland and the work that excluded her 
from Swiss society. Thus, Eva performs her agency throughout the play firstly through 
her long subscription to the norms around assisted suicide, despite her training in 
medicine, and secondly through her conscious abandonment of those same norms.  
  Turning now to Strom’s performance of agency, the physician is perhaps the 
most consistent performer of a particular kind of agency throughout the play; this 
performance is to be found primarily in his commitment to his work and in his subversive 
identification with, and redefinition of, the role of the physician. Perhaps the cornerstone 
of Strom’s subversion of the role of the physician, and that which compels him to engage 
in helping his patients to die, is his interpretation of the Hippocratic oath. As he states 
towards the beginning of the play: “Mein Name ist Gustav Strom. Ich bin Arzt. Die Frage 
kommt immer: Sie haben doch den Hippokratischen Eid geleistet. Ja, habe ich. Wie 
können Sie also Menschen in den Tod begleiten. Gerade weil ich ihn geleistet habe” (12). 
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By interpreting the oath in such a way that aiding in the suicide of a patient is in fact a 
method of treatment for the incurable, rather than simply causing harm, Strom commits 
himself not only to treating those patients who should seek his aid in this way, but 
reconceptualises the role of the physician in regards to suicide. Strom’s interpretation of 
the Hippocratic oath and his subsequent reconceptualization of the role of the physician 
in this case makes aiding in another’s suicide an ethical requirement not only for him, but 
for physicians more generally. Thus, Strom places himself in direct conflict with the 
discursive norms associated with the medical institution – and in direct alignment with 
those around assisted dying. 
 Later in the play, in the scene following the stripping of his medical license by the 
medical board, Strom converses with his landlord, Walter. Walter is rather disturbed, 
having seen Strom on the television discussing the methods with which he helps others 
commit suicide, and brings this up to Strom: 
Walter – Ich habe Sie im Fernsehen gesehen. […] Wie Sie über Ihre Methode          
               gesprochen haben. Herr Doktor. Das geht doch nicht.  
Gustav – Was geht nicht. 
Walter – Mit diesem Plastiksack. […] 
Gustav – Wir haben leider keine andere Wahl. […] Man hat mich aus der     
               Ärztekammer ausgeschlossen. […] Ich darf keine Rezepte mehr    
               verschreiben. 
Walter – So sind Sie etwa kein Doktor mehr. 
Strom – Natürlich bin ich noch Doktor. (34) 
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Despite being formally stripped of his medical license, Strom does not consider himself 
to have ceased being a physician, and accordingly, does not consider himself free from 
the obligations of a physician; following his interpretation of the Hippocratic oath, these 
duties include aiding others in taking their own lives. Again, Strom reconceptualises the 
role of the physician in direct opposition to the medical institution, this time by 
continuing his activities as a Sterbehelfer; essentially, acting as he believes a physician 
ought to. By continuing to call himself  “Doktor,” Strom claims authority over the truth 
of the term, again in direct opposition to the medical board and in spite of their attempts 
to discipline him and regulate his behaviour. Essentially, when he could have submitted 
to the board, he does not, rather enmeshing himself further in the norms surrounding 
assisted dying. 
 Lastly, Strom’s performance of agency is marked not only by his identification 
with the norms around assisted dying and his reconceptualization of the role of the 
physician, but of his identification with what could be considered one of the central parts 
of a good physician’s conduct: good bedside manner. Throughout the play, Strom 
displays excellent bedside manner and knowledge of the nuances of caring for his 
patients as they pass on. When meeting with John for the first time, Strom reminds him 
that “You [John] are all that matters” (23), and at their final meeting after John admits his 
fear of death, that “it will be very easy,” and not to worry (48). Additionally, after being 
released from investigative custody, he pointedly reminds Alice, “Du [Alice] bist wichtig. 
Deine Wünsche. Dass alles gut vorbereitet ist. Dass du keine Angst zu haben brauchst” 
(40). In these interactions, Strom embodies compassion, a fundamental part of being a 
physician, even one congruent with the medical board’s definition and despite the board’s 
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eventual refusal to identify him as such. Essentially, Strom performs his agency by 
wilfully moving between the discursive norms associated with what it means to be a 
physician, regulated by the medical institution, and those he constructs himself – each 
time laying claim to the truth of the term “physician” and what it means. 
 Strom, however, cannot be read as an entirely positive force in the play; despite 
his apparently good bedside manner and subversive support for the norms governing 
assisted dying, Strom’s commitment to his work borders on a single-mindedness that 
threatens to descend into obsession, perhaps even delusions of grandeur. Strom is, 
throughout the play, depicted as a character capable of deep empathy, someone who sees 
their life’s work in helping those who cannot help themselves. But, perhaps paradoxically, 
his commitment to this work results in a kind of zealotry that, although Strom remains 
true to his principles, causes him to extend a helping hand to his patients regardless of 
their circumstances, and despite any harm his action may cause; for example, in helping 
Alice to end her life, he knowingly contributes to Lotte’s suffering, and having helped to 
take Lotte’s reason to live from her, enables her suicide. The reasons Alice and Lotte 
wished to end their lives were irrelevant, as was his role in the situation; as Strom 
explains early in the play, “Prinzipien sind mir gleichgültig” (13). Essentially, in 
remaining strongly committed to the humanist discourses of self-determination that 
legitimize his activity, resisting the broader medical discourse, Strom loses something of 
his human empathy, in that the nature of the individual’s suffering is secondary to a 
greater imperative: helping the suffering individual to die. 
 Strom’s disconnection from the suffering of the individual patient in favour of a 
grander imperative is most plainly seen in the last scene of the play. In a monologue, 
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Strom explains his thoughts on the public perception of his work, coming to the 
conclusion that his work is oriented not merely towards helping others to act out their 
individual wills, but it is in fact the performance of an ultimately necessary function for 
society on the whole. As Strom claims, 
Es ist die Notwendigkeit meiner Arbeit, die [die Leute] erschreckt. In unseren 
Umständen bin ich unentbehrlich, aber wie Kinder glauben sie an einen Garten 
Eden hier im Diesseits […] sie denken die Krankheit weiter, die Medizin und alle 
Technik, würden ihnen eines Tages nicht bloß die Geschwüre abzaubern, sondern 
die Idee der Krankheit überhaupt. (56) 
Strom believes that, out of this dream of unending health and wellness, grounded by an 
unreasonable faith in technology and medicine, humanity will progress beyond the limits 
of the body, only to nonetheless reach its end; “wir werden uns nicht in eine andere 
Richtung entwickeln als zum Tod hin, ein großer Fortschritt ist ein großer Schritt zum 
Ende hin” (56). Accordingly, Strom sees himself, and potentially others like him, as 
necessary for society to maintain its ignorance of the flaws in their faith in technology: 
“die Technik ist zu stark für unseren schwachen Körper, sie wissen das, sie wissen, einen 
wie mich werden sie brauchen, je länger, je mehr. Einer, der den Schalter dreht, wenn die 
Birne längst verglüht und das Licht aus ist. Einer, der ihnen die Finsternis bringt” (57). 
In conceptualizing himself as a kind of feared yet necessary force for the good of 
society, Strom redefines his role as a physician to such lengths that, in many ways, it is 
no longer recognizable as the role of a medical doctor. His role in society, based on his 
peculiarly broad view on empathy and compassion, focused as it seems to be on the 
“greater good,” rather than the individual, coupled with his fixation on his purpose as an 
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ultimately necessary “bringer of death,” places him firmly outside the role of the 
physician as defined by the broader medical discourse. Specifically, he no longer sees 
death as a failure; where the physician traditionally sees death as his opponent, focusing 
his efforts on the prevention and curing of diseases, Strom sees death as a way for his 
patients’ incurable suffering to be alleviated; in a way, a cure in itself. In the end, for all 
his focus on the importance of self-determination and dignity for his patients, Strom’s 
subversive conduct is that which prompts the reader to question “das Narrativ vom 
assistierten Suizid als selbstbestimmtes, würdevolles Sterben” the text presents (Welsh 
510). Despite having strayed so far from the institutionally sanctioned definition of the 
physician, Strom continues to consider himself a doctor, and as such continues to perform 
his agency in accordance with his radically subversive understanding of the role.  
 Strom and Eva, in their roles as representatives of the medical community, each 
performs a kind of agency throughout the play. Through acts of resistance against 
dominant discourses, be they re-definitions of what it means to be a physician or what 
conduct is acceptable of one with education in medicine, and even by returning to and 
identifying with norms their actions previously subverted, the characters perform a 
degree of agency. Although they cannot be said to be truly independent in their agency, 
due to this agency remaining enmeshed in options for compliance and resistance that are 
inherent in the discursive model, their particular actions result in resistance of and 
movement between discursive norms. 
Conclusion 
By considering the characters and institutions seen in Alices Reise in die Schweiz, 
I have attempted to show that the topic of assisted dying is one that exists within a 
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network of institutional discourses, and that, in considering how various characters in the 
text interact with these discourses, what subversive and normalizing influences are at 
work in the text. Additionally, in considering the resistive actions taken by the characters, 
I have sought to expose these acts of resistance as performances of agency, in order to 
discuss assisted dying within a framework that not only acknowledges the power of 
institutions and their effects on the individual, but also recognizes the importance of 
autonomy to the assisted dying debate. Lastly, Alices Reise in die Schweiz provides a 
unique perspective on the limits placed on the individual and the modes of resistance that 
are possible in the face of these limits, as they pertain to assisted dying – and accordingly, 
highlights the influence of the institution and the extent of patients’ possible agency in 
these situations. 
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the shift in knowledge indicated by 
the play. Just as in Switzerland, as represented in Alices Reise in die Schweiz, humanist 
discourses are beginning to subvert the bio-political in Canada. As evidenced by the 
recently repealed ban on assisted suicide, an older, religiously based “knowledge” of the 
sanctity of life is being replaced by a new “knowledge” of self-determination; specifically, 
the individual’s right to die. In highlighting this shift, the play grounds itself firmly in 
contemporary discourses around assisted dying, both within and beyond the Swiss 
consciousness.3 
In the following chapter, the conclusion of my thesis project, I will synthesize the 
conclusions reached in the above pages with those reached in the first part of my analysis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The play, first performed in 2005, preceded a 2006 ruling in Switzerland that established guidelines for 
allowing mentally ill persons to seek assistance in taking their lives, as mentioned in the research context 
chapter of this thesis. While these two events are by no means definitively linked, this chronology suggests 
that the topics of mental health and assisted suicide were circulating in the Swiss public discourse at the 
time, and points to the play’s possible significance in or relevance to discussions of the topics. 
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with the aim of reaching further conclusions about the portrayal and role of assisted 
suicide in Jürg Reinhart and Alices Reise in die Schweiz, as well as place those findings 
within the broader context that informs this project. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 Through my analysis of Max Frisch’s novel Jürg Reinhart and Lukas Bärfuss’ 
play Alices Reise in die Schweiz, in which I have considered the topics of personal agency 
and institutional power in respect to portrayals of assisted dying, I have sought to answer 
two main questions: first, in light of the historical taboo surrounding assisted dying, how 
has the contemporary discourse about assisted dying changed since prior to the Second 
World War? And second, although there may or may not have been significant changes 
to the discourse about assisted dying, has there been a shift in the representation of 
personal agency and the role of institutional power? 
 However, before proceeding to my overall conclusions, I will first discuss the 
fruits of my analyses text by text. In approaching the representations of institutional 
power in Jürg Reinhart, three discourses appeared to be of particular influence: the 
juridical, the medical, and the religious. Throughout the novel, characters justify their 
actions, or often their inaction, by citing the regulatory influence of specific institutional 
bodies; this is done, for example, through characters stating their inability or 
unwillingness to do something based on legal or religious reasons or restrictions. 
Additionally, there is an underlying humanist discourse of self-determination running 
throughout the novel, particularly in reference to the Baroness’ actions as she advocates 
for her daughter. 
 In terms of the representations of agency found in the novel, restricted for the 
purpose of this thesis to those in relation to assisted dying, performances thereof are to be 
seen primarily in the actions of the Baroness, Inge, and Jürg. However, these 
performances seem to be tightly linked to characters apart from the “agent” themselves. 
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Firstly, the Baroness’ actions, while subversive, are conducted nearly always as requests 
directed towards others; indeed, when presented with an opportunity to act on her own, 
she fails to do so. Secondly, Jürg’s conduct, specifically his actions leading up to helping 
Inge to die, although independently carried out, are done at her behest, rather than his 
own. Although his act is subversive, in that it undermines norms around the treatment of 
the terminally ill, Jürg does not seem to want to perform these actions. Lastly, Inge is, for 
the vast majority of the novel, neither portrayed as an agent nor seen as one by the other 
characters, and it is only in the moments before her death that she has any sort of agency 
ascribed to her.  
 Alices Reise in die Schweiz, much like Jürg Reinhart, shows evidence for the 
influence of multiple discursive frameworks, in this case, the institutions of the juridical, 
the medical, and the public sphere. Throughout the play, the characters are clearly under 
the regulatory influence of these discourses, as evidenced by their actions being either 
simply regulated, as in the case of Lotte’s early conduct in relation to her daughter’s wish 
to die, or in the characters suffering discipline at the hands of these frameworks, such as 
in the case of the stripping of Strom’s medical license by the medical board. 
 Performances of agency are found throughout the play as well. These 
performances take two main forms: outright resistance against the norms prescribed by 
dominant discourses, for example Strom and his conception of the role of the physician 
and the meaning of the Hippocratic oath, or as independent retreat from an establishment 
of alternative, subversive norms, such as in the case of Eva and her eventual choice to 
distance herself from Strom and his work, despite her original commitment. In either case, 
the characters, finding themselves under a particular normative influence, make the 
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conscious choice to move away from those norms, often establishing new, subversive 
roles, and occasionally, moving away from those subversive understandings in turn. 
 Knowing this about the representations of institutional power and agency in 
relation to assisted dying in my chosen texts, I come to several conclusions about my 
research questions. Firstly, the discursive institutions portrayed in Jürg Reinhart and 
Alices Reise in die Schweiz, while similar in the fact that they both heavily feature the 
juridical and medical discourses, are not identical, the key difference being the strong 
presence of religious discourse in the former, as opposed to the showcasing of the 
influence of the public sphere in the latter. Additionally, the influence of humanist 
discourses of self-determination is apparent throughout both texts, often expressed by 
characters as a justification for their subversive actions. These findings suggest that while 
the nature of the discursive influence around assisted dying has perhaps not changed 
significantly in the time between 1933-34 and 2005, the source of this influence has. 
These works, when viewed side-by-side, suggest that the influence of religious discourse 
on discussions of assisted dying has decreased, being displaced by influence from the 
public sphere; this is, however, not to say that religious discourse does not play a role in 
the contemporary discussion. Although this reference to religion occurs infrequently in 
Alices Reise in die Schweiz, hence its omission from my analysis, it appears to play a 
minor role; for example, a former neighbour refers to Strom as “ein Gottloser Sauhund, 
ein Teufelsknecht” (Bärfuss 21), categorizing him and by extension his work as immoral 
by positioning it against God’s wishes. Owing however to its relatively minor role, I must 
still contend for this shift in the discourses at play, however minor. 
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 Coming now to my second research category, the portrayal of agency in these 
texts is vastly different. As mentioned above, the performance of agency in Jürg Reinhart 
is, while relatively prolific, heavily contextualized, in that in nearly every case, a given 
character’s agency with respect to assisted dying is performed in direct relation to another, 
instead of on the basis of their own motivations. The Baroness’ conduct is always in 
respect to her daughter’s needs, and Jürg helps Inge in her suicide only because she asks 
him to; indeed, the only character who seems to perform their agency independently is 
Inge, when she urges Jürg to take her life, even though for much of the novel she is not 
portrayed as having any kind of independence. Alices Reise in die Schweiz, on the other 
hand, features complex and manifold examples of characters performing what appears to 
be a truly, even if not in the discursive sense, independent agency. For example, John 
insists on ending his life on his own terms, even if that requires multiple trips to 
Switzerland and the multiple acceptances and rejections of discursive norms those trips 
suggest, and Strom strictly adheres to the subversive principle of self-determination that 
guides his conduct, regardless of its possibly questionable moral value. It is clear, then, 
that the depiction of agency in these texts is significantly different, with the performances 
in Alices Reise in die Schweiz being much more indicative of an independent agency, and 
thus can be seen to play a more significant role in the text. 
 With the above conclusions in mind, it is can be seen that the texts in question 
suggest that the discourses around assisted dying have changed, in that religious 
discourse has given way, at least in some part, to public discourse more generally, as can 
be seen in the prominence of representations of their respective discursive influence in 
the texts. Additionally, in so far as it is seen in the texts, the portrayal of agency has 
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become both more prolific and more important to the narrative. These conclusions, 
through the discursive relationship literature has with the greater public discourse, 
suggest that there could be similar developments in reality. The importance, and staying 
power, of the subject is clear to see in the texts, and functions in turn as the reflection of 
the interests and concerns of the public. 
 The importance of this analysis, however, lies not in the texts themselves, but 
rather in their greater contexts. As I mentioned towards the beginning of this thesis, I 
chose Alices Reise in die Schweiz and Jürg Reinhart for this endeavor by virtue of their 
country of origin: Switzerland. Switzerland remains the only country in the world where 
assisted suicide services are available to non-citizens, a place to where one can book a 
one-way ticket and end one’s life peacefully, even if one’s own country does not condone 
the practice. Thus, Swiss discourses around assisted suicide, and the literature that 
engages with them, also remain relevant for people outside of Switzerland who engage 
with assisted suicide in some fashion: patients, their families, policy makers and 
healthcare professionals alike. It follows, then, that the insights into the functioning of the 
discourses around assisted suicide gained in this thesis may be applicable to a range of 
discussions on the topic, even beyond Swiss borders. 
 Accordingly, an area for possible further research may lie in the relationship 
between contemporary texts’ treatments of assisted dying more generally, within and 
beyond German-language literature. Just as I have examined my chosen texts’ 
representations of assisted dying in terms of their portrayals of institutional power and 
agency, a similar comparison could be conducted between contemporary texts, in order to 
extract more complete understandings of the discursive framework within which assisted 
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dying exists, while maintaining the importance of agency to the modern discussions 
around these questions. Questions of assisted dying are undoubtedly a subject of great 
contemporary concern, and it is literature, due to its role in simultaneously reflecting and 
subverting discourse, that can help us reach deeper understandings of the debate that 
surrounds it even now. It is through the narrative’s ability to present difficult and 
intensely personal topics like assisted dying in more accessible ways that we can more 
easily examine questions around these topics. Thus, through these representations, which 
themselves are informed by ideas around the subject present in the public discourse, one 
has unique access to a subject, and as such, the ability to reach conclusions particular to 
that access. Therefore, by approaching assisted dying through literature, we have the 
potential to see the topic in a new light and to arrive at new and interesting, perhaps even 
unprecedented, results. 
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